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Act LVIII of 2001 on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, which entered into effect on 13 July 2001, defines the 
primary objective of Hungary’s central bank as the achievement and maintenance of price stability. Low inflation 
allows the economy to function more effectively, contributes to better economic growth over time and helps to 
moderate cyclical fluctuations in output and employment. 
In the inflation targeting system, since August 2005 the Bank has sought to attain price stability by ensuring an 
inflation rate near the 3% medium-term objective. The Monetary Council, the supreme decision-making body of the 
Magyar Nemzeti Bank, performs a comprehensive review of the expected development of inflation every three 
months, in order to establish the monetary conditions consistent with achieving the inflation target. The Council’s 
decision is the result of careful consideration of a wide range of factors, including an assessment of prospective 
economic developments, the inflation outlook, money and capital market trends and risks to stability. 
In order to provide the public with clear insight into the operation of monetary policy and to enhance transparency, 
the Bank publishes the information available at the time of making its monetary policy decisions. The Report 
presents the inflation forecasts prepared by the Monetary Strategy and Economic Analysis and Financial Analysis 
Departments, as well as the macroeconomic developments underlying these forecasts. The forecasts are based on 
certain assumptions. Hence, in producing its forecasts, the staff assumes an unchanged monetary and fiscal policy. 
In respect of economic variables exogenous to monetary policy, the forecasting rules used in previous issues of the 
Report are applied. 
The analyses in this Report were prepared by staff in the MNB’s Monetary Strategy and Economic Analysis 
and Financial Analysis Departments under the general direction of Ágnes Csermely, Director. The project 
was managed by Mihály András Kovács, Deputy Head of Monetary Strategy and Economic Analysis, with 
the help of Mihály Hoffman, Gergely Kiss and Barnabás Virág. The Report was approved for publication 
by Ferenc Karvalits, Deputy Governor. 
Primary contributors to this Report include: Gergely Baksay, Péter Bauer, Szilárd Benk, Katalin Bodnár, 
Mihály Hoffmann, Zoltán M. Jakab, Gergely Kiss, Norbert Kiss M., András Komáromi, Mihály András 
Kovács, Zsolt Lovas, Miklós Lukács, Ádám Martonosi, Zsusza Munkácsi, Benedek Nobilis, Gábor 
Pellényi, Róbert Szemere,  Tímea Várnai, Viktor Várpalotai and Barnabás Virág. Other contributors to the 
analyses and forecasts in this Report include various staff members of the Monetary Strategy and 
Economic Analysis and the Financial Analysis Departments. 
The Report incorporates valuable input from the Monetary Council’s comments and suggestions following 
its meetings on 13 May and 25 May 2009. The projections and policy considerations, however, reflect the 
views of staff in the Monetary Strategy and Economic Analysis and the Financial Analysis Departments 
and do not necessarily reflect those of the Monetary Council or the MNB. 
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Summary 
Deteriorating 
opportunities for 
external funding have 
put significant pressure 
on the Hungarian 
economy to adjust 
The international financial market crisis and the associated global 
economic recession have resulted in significant stress on the 
Hungarian economy to adjust. The general reappraisal of risk, 
coupled with a dramatic decline in demand for risky assets, has 
forced a rapid reduction in the country’s external financing 
requirement. The combination of tighter credit conditions, budgetary 
measures to maintain fiscal balance and the recent real depreciation 
of the forint has resulted in a significant reduction in external 
imbalance and, consequently, the vulnerability of the domestic 
economy. However, in terms of its impact on economic activity, the 
procyclical behaviour of both the financial sector and fiscal policy is 
likely to cause the current downturn to be deeper and more 
protracted. As a consequence, the economy is only expected to 
return to a robust growth path in 2011. Inflation may remain 
subdued over the entire forecast period, net of the first-round effects 
of the tax measures. 
Confidence has 
improved in 
international financial 
markets, but risk 
appetite remains well 
below pre-crisis levels 
During the last quarter, there was some improvement in the various 
measures of risk tolerance in international financial markets. 
Nevertheless, considerable uncertainty remains in relation to the 
quality of the global banking system’s lending portfolio and the 
amount of capital needed to repair banks’ balance sheets, due to 
write-offs of toxic assets and deep recession. With the improvement 
in global investor sentiment, the assessment of risks associated with 
the Hungarian economy has also become more benign. Despite this, 
there is no firm evidence yet of significant strengthening in investors’ 
demand for risky assets. 
Lending has continued 
to contract 
Direct lending by the government and the introduction of new policy 
instruments by the MNB have helped satisfy domestic economic 
agents’ need for foreign currency and ensure that they have ample 
HUF liquidity. Bank lending, however, remains constrained: in line 
with global developments, domestic banks are attempting to reduce 
loan-to-deposit ratios and slow the growth of their risky asset 
portfolios. 
Global economic 
activity slowed sharply 
in the first quarter, but 
there have been some 
tentative signs of 
stabilisation in recent 
months 
World trade dropped off by nearly one-fifth in the first few months 
of 2009. The deterioration in export prospects led to falling 
employment, with the result that various measures of consumer 
sentiment also declined to historical lows, in addition to business 
confidence. Based on the latest data, however, the slow recovery in 
business expectations and de-stocking may suggest that business 
conditions in the world’s large economies are stabilising. Fiscal 
stimulus packages and recent monetary policy easing by central banks 
may have played a significant role in this. The available information, 
however, does not point to a quick rebound, but rather indicates that 
the pace of economic decline may be bottoming out gradually. 
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The recession in the 
Hungarian economy 
accelerated in 2009 
Q1, with the corporate 
sector responding by 
sharp reductions in 
employment and wage 
freezes 
While the decline in export markets occurred in conjunction with 
strong domestic demand in other countries in the region last year, in 
Hungary both external and domestic demand fell as an effect of the 
fiscal tightening since 2006. However, the financial crisis has caused a 
sharp drop in household expenditure in all European countries over 
the past six months and, consequently, the gap between Hungary, 
where the recession continued to deepen, and the European average 
narrowed. 
The corporate sector attempted to adjust to the rapid decline in 
output in numerous ways, including reducing hours worked, cutting 
back bonus payments, freezing regular pay in several instances and 
significantly reducing the number of employees. 
These actions, however, only proved to be partially successful in 
offsetting the rapid deterioration in sales prospects, and as a result 
unit labour costs continued to rise. Corporate sector profitability 
deteriorated sharply, given firms’ inability to raise their prices, due to 
slack demand. 
Declining demand has 
offset the inflationary 
effects of exchange rate 
depreciation 
The rapid decline in inflation seen in previous months did not 
continue in early 2009, with CPI inflation and core inflation both 
fluctuating around 3%, a level consistent with price stability, in the 
first four months of the year. The fact that inflation was close to the 
target was, however, the result of a number of contrasting forces. 
Core inflation continued to fall, despite the sharp depreciation of the 
forint in recent quarters, due mainly to the disinflationary effects of 
fading demand. On the other hand, exchange rate weakness has had 
more pronounced effects on unprocessed food prices, where the 
import content is high and the income elasticity of demand is 
relatively low. 
Deep recession in 
2009, slow recovery in 
2010, robust growth is 
projected for 2011 
In the baseline projection, world economic activity only recovers 
slightly in 2010, while the global output gap closes in 2011 with a 
marked expansion in output. Nevertheless, lending activity remains 
very subdued over the entire forecast period, due to a prolonged 
period of deleveraging by banks. 
In the current projection, the Hungarian economy contracts more 
sharply than the European average, as the slowdown in business 
activity abroad, the tight supply of credit and the government’s fiscal 
measures simultaneously exert negative effects on growth. GDP is 
expected to shrink by nearly 7% this year and by around 1% next 
year. However, the economy is expected to recover strongly in 2011, 
as external business activity may begin to pick up and the positive 
medium-term impact of the fiscal adjustment may materialise at that 
horizon. In addition, the significant amount of spare capacity in the 
economy also points to a robust expansion. 
The current projection 
is based manly on the 
assumption that the 
measure announced by 
the government on 19 
April are implemented 
The measures taken by the government will strongly influence 
developments in domestic demand. Amidst the current conditions, 
the Hungarian budget can only be financed and maintained if the 
impact of the deterioration in economic prospects does not result in 
a significant rise in the deficit. However a partial operation of 
automatic fiscal stabilisers is possible, as a result of the agreement 
concluded with international institutions. 
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Consequently, as a combined effect of the new measures and a 
deteriorating macro outlook, the fiscal deficit may be around 3.9% 
this year. Budgetary processes in 2010 are surrounded by a 
considerable degree of uncertainty. Based on an estimate for the 
effects of government measures derived from available information, 
a 4.5% deficit is projected for next year. The downward path for 
deficit, undertaken in an agreement between Hungary and 
international institutions, will require drawing up a detailed package 
of measures equal to some 0.7% of GDP. 
The package of measures announced in Hungary is likely to 
undermine demand and deepen the recession over the short term, 
but is expected to help the economy recover from 2010, as the 
planned restructuring of taxes and measures to increase the supply of 
labour may improve competitiveness and contribute to long-term 
growth. Preserving the sustainability of deficit financing, the 
restructuring of taxes aimed to strengthen competitiveness and 
expenditure-reducing measures to improve the debt path over the 
longer term may help to restore market confidence and, indirectly, 
contribute to faster growth through a reduction in the costs of 
financing for the economy. 
Companies and 
households are 
adjusting to the 
deteriorating and 
increasingly uncertain 
income outlook by 
scaling back 
expenditure 
 
The decline in external business activity will lower production in the 
export sector this year, with a slight recovery expected in 2010. 
Although over the short run Hungarian exports are likely to drop off 
more sharply than external business activity, the recent real 
depreciation of the forint and reductions in taxes on labour will 
contribute to an improvement in export competitiveness, and 
consequently we expect to see an increase in the country’s market 
share from 2010. 
Firms have cut back investment spending in response to the 
worsening economic conditions. Companies are adjusting to the 
decline in sales by reducing employment more sharply than expected 
and by freezing wages. Although the government’s measures are 
likely to stimulate labour demand and supply over the longer term, 
the negative effect of the recession on employment will dominate in 
the short term. Consequently, a fall in employment and an increase 
unemployment, associated with very modest wage growth, are 
expected over the period to the end of 2010. In 2011, however, 
employment and earnings growth may rise again, and unemployment 
may fall. 
Over the short term, deteriorating sales prospects and the 
contraction of credit supply will cause firms to scale back investment 
spending sharply. Nonetheless, corporate investment is expected to 
recover gradually, as external demand improves. Profitability may 
gradually move near the pre-crisis levels in 2011, with the reduction 
in taxes on labour playing a significant role in restoring profitability. 
In 2010–2011, greater income uncertainty caused by declining 
employment, coupled with tighter credit conditions, will result in a 
significant deterioration in the outlook for household consumption 
and investment, and thus the sector’s propensity to save is expected 
to increase significantly. In 2011, however, household consumption 
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and investment spending may rise, as household income increases. 
The rate of import growth is expected to slow significantly, due to 
the sharp decline in domestic absorption. As a result, the 
contribution of net trade to growth may be positive over the entire 
forecast period, despite the fall in exports. 
Downside risks to 
growth remain 
The baseline projection assumes a deep and protracted recession, and 
we continue to see the balance of risks on the downside. A steeper-
than-expected decline in bank lending, coupled with a larger fall in 
potential output in response to the financial crisis compared to what 
is envisaged in the projection, may deepen the recession. 
Inflation is expected to 
be below target, despite 
the increase in indirect 
taxes 
The current projection is based on the following assumptions: (i) the 
exchange rate remains at EUR/HUF 295; (ii) the price of oil ranges 
between USD 50–60 per barrel; and (iii) the measures announced by 
the government are implemented in full. Provided that these 
assumptions hold, inflation may rise to close to 6.5% by the end of 
this year. This is due to the effects of the increase in the rate of VAT 
and other indirect taxes. The inflation rate, net of the effects of 
changes in taxes, may remain below the target over the entire forecast 
period. Despite the depreciation of the forint over the past year, 
declining domestic economic activity, falling consumption in 
response to the austerity measures affecting the household sector and 
the reduction in taxes on labour are expected to result in a very low 
inflation environment over the medium term through more moderate 
growth of wage costs. 
The balance of risks around the inflation projection is to the upside. 
A more protracted decline in bank lending than assumed in the 
projection represents a slight downside risk, while a larger-than-
expected decline in potential output poses a strong upside risk to 
inflation. 
Sharply falling 
external financing 
requirement 
External balance is expected to improve significantly, driven mainly 
by the rise in the propensity of households to save. In addition, 
however, reductions in the tax burden on firms and tighter credit 
conditions in the corporate sector may contribute to a fall in the 
financing requirement. 
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2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Core inflation1 5.4 5.2 4.4 3.5 1.3
Consumer price index 8.0 6.1 4.5 4.3 1.9
External demand (GDP based) 3.8 2.1 -3.2 0.1 2.0
Household consumption expenditure 0.7 -0.7 -8.0 -2.9 2.9
Gross fixed capital formation 1.5 -2.6 -10.3 0.8 4.2
Domestic absorption -1.0 -0.1 -7.9 -1.7 2.9
Export 15.9 4.6 -15.1 3.0 8.7
Import2 13.1 4.0 -16.7 2.1 8.3
GDP* 1.1 0.5 -6.7 -0.9 3.4
As a percentage of GDP 6.5 8.4 4,1 4,0 3,3
In EUR billions 6.6 8.9 3,6 3,5 3,1
As a percentage of GDP 5.4 7.4 2,0 1,4 -0,2
Whole-economy gross average earnings3 8.0 7.6 -0.3 2.1 4.5
Whole-economy employment4 -0.1 -1.2 -3.2 -1.7 0.7
Private sector gross average earnings5 9.1 (8.5) 8.5 (8.0) 3.0 3.0 4.5
Private sector employment4 0.9 -1.1 -4.0 -2.1 0.9
Unit labour costs in the private sector4,6 4.0 6.2 5.7 2.0 1.6
Household real income** -3.2 -1.4 -4.3 -1.6 1.8
Labour market
Current account deficit2
Summary table of the baseline scenario
Economic growth
Inflation (annual average)
External financing requirement 2
Actual Projection
1  From May 2009 on, calculated according to the joint methodology of the CSO and MNB. 2  Due to the high 
level of Net Errors and Omissions (NEO) the current account deficit/external financing requirement for the 2004-
2007 period may be higher than suggested by official figures. 3  Calculated on a cash-flow basis. 4  According to the 
CSO LFS data. 5  According to the original CSO data. The numbers in brackets refer to wages excluding the 
effect of whitening and the changed seasonality of bonuses. 6  Private sector unit labour cost calculated with a wage 
index excluding the effect of whitening and the changed seasonality of bonuses.
* Figures refer to the original data, including calendar-year effects. ** MNB estimate.
(The forecasts are conditional: the baseline scenario represents the most probable scenario, 
which applies only if the assumptions presented in Chapter 3 materialise; unless otherwise 
indicated, it represents percentage changes on the previus year.)
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1. Evaluation of  the available macro-economic data 
Preliminary data indicate a significant 5.8% year-on-year decline in the gross domestic product in 
2009 Q1, excluding calendar effects. According to data reflecting quarterly changes, the extent of 
the decline is historically comparable to the recession observed during the years following the 
political changeover, and the Hungarian economy has been shrinking continuously for a year. 
This poor growth performance can be attributed to three main factors. First, international 
economic conditions have deteriorated significantly in recent quarters, inhibiting manufacturing 
on the production side, and investment and exports on the consumption side. Second, a sharp 
decline in bank lending activity has affected household consumption and investment. Finally, 
further fiscal tightening has also put downward pressure on household and government 
consumption. These effects were partly offset by a decline in import demand, and thus net 
exports may have made a positive contribution to growth. 
A review of the detailed data for 2008 Q4 reveals that Hungary has an unfavourable GDP 
structure in terms of the long-term prospects. The performance of the largest national economic 
sectors (manufacturing, market services) deteriorated more rapidly and more significantly than 
expected, and as a result the positive growth effect of certain one-off factors in 2008 proved to 
be stronger than anticipated. These factors included the outstanding yield of agricultural 
production, some major infrastructure investment projects, and certain base effects influencing 
state production.1 
Chart 1-1 Contribution of major national economic sectors to total output* 
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*Considering that time series with chain-type indices are not additive, aggregation errors were distributed between 
the individual items according to their weight. Dynamics calculated from the resulting adjusted time series are less 
reliable from a quantitative perspective (they differ from the original data), nevertheless, the chart may reflect 
prevailing trends accurately. 
 
                                                 
1 The annual dynamics of health care services were stimulated by the fact that a significantly larger number of 
patients used these services in 2008 Q4 than in the final quarter of 2007, when co-payments by patients were still in 
effect. 
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Chart 1-2 Annual growth of the main consumption items of GDP 
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Prolonged global recession and mild signs of stabilisation in industrial 
activity 
The world economy is currently facing the most severe recession in the last fifty years. Both 
financial and real economic factors contributed to the rapidly deepening international economic 
crisis. According to a retrospective evaluation by NBER, the US economy entered into recession 
in December 2007, which led to a global economic slowdown in 2008. The downturn was further 
aggravated by the mounting financial crisis triggered by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, a 
large US investment bank. Escalating turmoil in the international financial system in the autumn 
of 2008 resulted in profound liquidity and financing tensions on the international money market: 
interbank markets froze up, while banks’ tightening of credit conditions significantly constrained 
the ability of real economic actors to obtain credit. At the same time, international capital flows 
were driven by investors’ flight to low-risk investments. This tendency resulted in higher 
borrowing costs, particularly for emerging countries which run a current account deficit, such as 
Hungary. Consequently, the credit crisis rapidly spread around the world, shrinking consumption-
investment demand even further. 
At the turn of 2008-2009, world trade experienced an unprecedented decline of close to one-
fifth. In addition to the above factors, the spread of the crisis to trade finance may have 
contributed to this deterioration. Moreover, as globalisation has greatly lengthened corporate 
supply chains in recent years, extending them to a growing number of countries, the current 
recession hit a wider range of countries through trade relations more strongly and more rapidly 
than ever before. 
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Chart 1-3 Growth of world trade* 
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Economic policy responses to the crisis, particularly monetary and fiscal measures, were faster 
and more massive than those taken during similar episodes in the past, and went beyond the 
conventional framework.2 According to the IMF,3 thanks to these measures, it may be possible to 
avoid a recurrence of the Great Depression of 1929-33. On the other hand, resolving the 
problems of the financial system remains essential to recovery and, due to the complexity, cost 
and political difficulty of the task, the process has proven longer than expected. 
Confidence indicators which reliably measure the Hungarian economy’s external demand have 
suggested a stabilisation of business expectations in recent months. On the one hand, this may 
have resulted from the confidence-boosting effect of the announced economic policy measures. 
On the other hand, it appears that the shrinking volume of unsold stocks may put a halt to the 
decline in production. The rapid fall in industrial output in our region appears to have stopped, 
which might also indicate that economic activity may be close to bottoming out. 
                                                 
2 See Chapter 2 for details on the measures taken by central banks. 
3 ‘From Recession to Recovery: How Soon and How Strong?’ In: IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2009: Crisis and 
Recovery, IMF. 
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Chart 1-4 Changes in the EABCI, ESI composite and IFO confidence indicators* 
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export structure - 100. 
 
Chart 1-5 Volume of industrial output in the region, Germany and the euro area              
(seasonally adjusted levels)* 
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Due to easing global demand pressures, commodity prices stabilised in early 2009, and based on 
futures quotes, a prolonged recession may keep them at moderate levels in the near future. With 
regard to oil futures, markets appear to expect only mild price increases due to the prolonged 
recession. On the other hand, grain futures rose sharply partly in connection to the dry weather 
since the beginning of the year. In sum, the extent to which an eventual recovery in the global 
economy may revive commodity markets remains highly uncertain. 
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Chart 1-6 Changes in global commodity prices* 
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*Denominated in USD. The highlighted product groups (food, crude oil and metal) comprise around 80% of the 
commodity index total. Source: IMF IFS database. 
 
Hungarian economy is in recession 
Recently received data point to the acceleration of the economic slowdown in 2009 Q1. Real 
economic activity is still dominated by the international recession, the credit crunch and fiscal 
adjustment measures. 
Declining production has been felt in a wide range of sectors. Sharply falling external demand 
had an instantaneous, massive impact on industrial production. Due to the downsizing of 
inventories from historically high levels and the dispute between Russia and Ukraine over gas 
supplies, many factories were forced to halt production in January, contributing to the fall of 
capacity utilisation in the manufacturing industry to unprecedented low levels in 2009 Q1. At the 
same time, the volume of production in the manufacturing sector has stabilised in recent months. 
This is due partly to favourable external developments (the German cash-for-clunkers scheme 
and improving confidence indicators), and partly to the impact of the recent real depreciation of 
the forint in sectors sensitive to the real exchange rate (e.g. food industry). 
The decline in construction output slowed in Q1, and the construction contract portfolio 
indicates signs of stabilisation, and even some growth in March. As was the case in 2008 Q4, this 
mainly reflects the impact of infrastructure investment projects financed with EU funds. The 
situation is considerably more complex for building construction, where both the contract 
portfolio and the number of residential construction permits issued have declined. At the same 
time, the rate of decline in real housing prices has decelerated, and the number of occupancy 
permits issued increased significantly as previously started construction projects were completed. 
Nevertheless, scarce credit combined with the worsening income position of households further 
undermine the prospects for the construction industry, which is corroborated by the continuing 
fall in the sector’s confidence indicators. 
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Chart 1-7 Changes in construction industry output and the contract portfolio 
-90
-60
-30
0
30
60
90
120
150
M
ar
.0
4
Ju
n.
04
Se
pt
.0
4
D
ec
.0
4
M
ar
.0
5
Ju
n.
05
Se
pt
.0
5
D
ec
.0
5
M
ar
.0
6
Ju
n.
06
Se
pt
.0
6
D
ec
.0
6
M
ar
.0
7
Ju
n.
07
Se
pt
.0
7
D
ec
.0
7
M
ar
.0
8
Ju
ne
.0
8
Se
pt
.0
8
D
ec
.0
8
M
ar
.0
9
A
nn
ua
l c
ha
ng
e 
(p
er
 c
en
t)
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
A
nnual change (per cent)
Construction output (right axis) Total orders
Building orders Other construction orders
 
In summary, Q1 construction sector data indicate favourable developments in construction 
investments. At the same time, the sharp contraction in private sector value added and the drying 
up of bank lending boost the likelihood of a significant downturn in fixed capital formation, as 
these factors are expected to have set back investments in equipment and machinery. 
Corporate labour market adjustments, tighter credit conditions and the newly planned fiscal 
adjustment measures have resulted in deteriorating and more unpredictable income prospects for 
households. In conjunction with tighter borrowing conditions, this has led to an increase in 
precautionary savings, and the fall in household consumption and investment may continue. 
Amongst other things, these developments are reflected by financial accounts data for the first 
quarter and by retail sales figures, which indicate that the year-on-year decline in private 
consumption may have accelerated and that households’ propensity to save may have increased 
strongly. 
According to our calculations, the traditionally strong link between household consumption and 
retail sales has weakened in recent months. This may be explained by a rise in shopping tourism 
triggered by the weaker forint exchange rate and falling consumption of financial services. 
In addition, restrained government expenditure may have exerted downward pressure on the 
growth in public consumption. By contrast, foreign trade turnover data for the first few months 
suggest an improvement in net exports. This may be explained by the fact that in parallel with the 
decline in exports, export-related import demand has also weakened, which has complemented 
the effect of slacker domestic demand. Based on data available until February, terms of trade 
have started to improve, mainly due to the fall of fuel prices in the last half-year. 
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Chart 1-8 Developments in retail sales, net wage bill and household borrowing* 
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consumer price index. 
Chart 1-9 Changes in the trade balance* 
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*Based on foreign trade data, adjusted to reflect the methodology of national accounts. 
 
Intensifying adjustments on the labour market 
The sharp decline in sales has had a devastating effect on firms’ profitability. The private sector 
has reacted to rising unit labour costs by layoffs and wage cuts. While the private sector has seen 
a massive decline in the wage bill in recent months, this process must continue in order to restore 
corporate profitability. 
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Chart 1-10 Changes in unit labour costs in the private sector* 
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* Nowcast for 2009 Q1. Unit labour cost is the ratio of wage cost per employee and value added per employee. 
Employment cuts initially affected manufacturing primarily, but the service sector has also seen 
staff cuts in several areas in recent months. The majority of laid-off workers remained active job-
seekers instead of quitting the labour market, which is a critical aspect for the tightness of the 
labour market and runs contrary to the trends seen in previous years. At the same time, this also 
led to a marked rise of the rate of unemployment. 
Chart 1-11 Employment and unemployment in the national economy  
(seasonally adjusted data) 
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Wage adjustments initially appeared in restrained bonus payments at the end of 2008. Since 
January 2009 there is mounting evidence pointing to the freezing of regular wages as well: these 
remained unchanged in Q1 compared to 2008 Q4. In addition, according to a number of non-
representative surveys (Hay, Hewitt, Manpower) conducted in recent months, an increasingly 
large number of firms are planning on freezing wages. In fact, wage growth may have been even 
smaller than suggested by statistics considering that employees with lower salaries would have 
been more likely to lose their jobs than better-paid employees. 
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Restrained wages were complemented by a decline in the hours worked, which, according to 
statistics, primarily affected regular wages. In Q1, a number of one-off effects resulted in a 
decline in the number of hours worked, including loss of production due to days off in the period 
around Christmas and New Year’s Eve and the gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine. At the 
same time, an increasing number of firms announced the introduction of shorter work weeks. 
Chart 1-12 Evolution of regular wages in the private sector* 
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*Adjusted for the whitening of wages and seasonality. 
Chart 1-13 Number of hours worked in the private sector* 
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*Among those employed at least 60 hours per week. 
At the beginning of 2009, there was no increase in the remuneration base in the public sector. 
The annual increase in regular wages can be attributed to a carry-over effect, as municipalities’ 
annual wage increase last year was implemented as late as the middle of 2008. At the same time, 
gross average wages in the public sector significantly decreased in the first few months of the 
year, reflecting the introduction of the 13th month salary cap and the change in its disbursement 
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schedule.4 These developments are consistent with expectations of restrained wages in the public 
sector in 2009. 
 
Inflation near the target 
In the first four months of the year both inflation and core inflation were around 3%, a level 
consistent with price stability. Following the stable price indices observed in Q1, the overall 
consumer price index increased by 0.5 percentage points in April compared to March, but core 
inflation remained unchanged at 3.1% in the same month. The three main factors affecting 
inflation were the depreciation of the forint, firms’ increasing unit labour costs, and the decline in 
domestic demand. Of these factors the last appears to be dominant at present, as the effects of 
exchange rate weakening appear gradually, typically with a lag of several months. 
Chart 1-14 Inflation developments  
(annual change of monthly data) 
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The stability of core inflation masks some contrasting developments for specific items. In recent 
months, the volatility of prices of tradables has increased significantly. This mainly reflected 
changes in a major item, new vehicle prices, as the sharp fall in prices observed in March was 
followed by a large increase, considerably contributing to a higher annual index in April. In the 
meantime, inflation of other durables remained stable, consistent with expectations about the 
pass-through effect of exchange rate changes. Inflation of market services continued to decline, 
reaching a historical low level of around 4% at the beginning of the year. Processed food prices 
increased moderately, with monthly indices suggesting stable prices for the previous two months. 
                                                 
4 The average amount of compensation paid in 2009 instead of the 13th month salary is smaller than the 13th month 
monthly wage paid for the previous year. On the other hand, 50% of the 13th month salary for 2007 was paid in 
January 2008, while no such payment was made at the beginning of 2009. 
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Chart 1-15 Changes in certain inflation components 
(annual change of monthly data) 
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With regard to non-core items, the price of unprocessed food continued to increase. Weakening 
exchange rates may have contributed to the process, particularly because the share of imports is 
relatively high in this product group in the first months of the year. Fuel prices contributed to a 
decline in inflation, but this was due to a technical effect: the substantial increase in fuel prices 
observed in March 2008 fell out from the base of the annual index. Regarding regulated prices, 
the lack of a gas price increase at the beginning of 2009 – resulting from decreasing oil prices – 
had a particularly significant effect. At the same time, the tightening of medication assistance 
schemes in April was reflected in regulated prices. 
Inflation perceived by households stopped falling, even though the ratio of actual price increase 
reached record lows. This may be attributable to the fact that inflation perception can also reflect 
general economic sentiment. The anticipated VAT increase and a weaker forint exchange rate 
resulted in heightened inflation expectations. 
Chart 1-16 Household inflation perception and expectations - Median survey (for the past month 
and the next 12 months) 
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2. Financial markets and lending 
Improving global investment appetite 
Starting from the middle of March, some favourable changes occurred in the global market 
environment: an overall improvement in risk tolerance, rising stock exchange indices, and 
optimistic investor sentiment. Although during the first weeks following the publication of the 
previous Report the global financial markets were still characterised by heightened risk aversion 
and pessimism coupled with sharply falling stock exchange indices and high volatility, from the 
second week of March some improvement in general sentiment became evident. Encouraged by 
favourable reports by a number of US banks on the beginning of the year and led by the financial 
sector, major equity market indices turned positive, and then started to rise markedly, while risk 
appetite also rebounded. Contributing to the positive changes, a government package was 
announced for the management of the distressed assets of US banks, and the accounting rules of 
mandatory mark-to-market valuation were changed to a more favourable arrangement. However, 
even this period continued to witness some negative developments (concerns regarding swine flu, 
discouraging growth data and deteriorating projections), resulting in a pause or a turnaround in 
rising markets, reflecting the fragility of investor sentiment. Some market participants are hoping 
that the worst of the crisis has passed, and opinions are mainly based on the developments in 
certain leading confidence indicators. However, several analyses demonstrate the need for caution 
when it comes to overestimating the importance of these indicators. 
Additional government measures and supranational actions played a key role in the improving 
market sentiment as well. The results of the G-20 summit were more tangible than in the past 
and were greeted with a favourable market reception. At the summit of the largest developed and 
developing economies, attended by the leaders of the European Union, the most important 
issues discussed included the replenishment of IMF funds, cracking down on tax havens, 
stimulating world trade, harmonising fiscal stimulus packages, renouncing protectionist economic 
policies and tightening the regulation of the financial system. Moreover, the US government put 
an end to the uncertainty that had surrounded the US financial sector for months by announcing 
the PPIP (Public Private Investment Program) package. In addition, the stress test analysis of US 
banks was completed and the results allayed fears that the state would shortly have to provide an 
additional, large-scale capital injection to banks. However, a number of sceptical market analyses 
raised doubts regarding the solidity of the stress test results. 
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Chart 2-1 Changes in risk indices* 
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*Indicators reflecting spreads on EUR-denominated debt in a breakdown by credit rating. Source: JPMorgan. 
Consolidation of developed interbank markets continued. By the beginning of May, TED spreads 
decreased to 70-90 basis points, which for the euro implies values close to those preceding the 
default of Lehman Brothers, while for the dollar these values are below that level. While LIBOR-
OIS spreads declined gradually during the period, they have not reached the levels prevailing 
before September 2008.5 The fact that the reallocation of liquidity is increasingly returning to the 
interbank markets is indicative of improving interbank market conditions. Consequently, recourse 
to the standing facilities of major central banks has decreased significantly, and the previously 
fast-growing central bank sterilisation portfolios have stagnated in recent months, and are 
expected to dissipate soon after the longer maturity contracts expire. Nevertheless, banks’ CDS 
spreads do not reflect a return of confidence in financial institutions. The fact that banks’ 
solvency problems have recently taken the spotlight as opposed to their liquidity problems may 
be the underlying reason for this. In the coming months investors are expected to focus their 
attention on lending losses and increasing provisioning. 
Although for the most part of the period financial markets were characterised by continuing 
optimism and easing tensions, as was pointed out in Chapter 1 real economic developments 
remained unfavourable. In parallel with the economic downturn, downward risks remained 
pronounced with respect to inflation. According to the ECB’s inflation forecast, inflation is 
poised to undershoot the target in the euro area both in 2009 and in 2010 (0.4% and 1%, 
respectively). The Fed warns that the level of the projected price index may be below the level 
required for facilitating long-term economic growth and price stability. In addition, central banks 
forecasted price indices to turn negative in a number of developed countries (Switzerland, Japan) 
in 2009. 
                                                 
5 The TED spreads are calculated as the difference between the short-term, three-month interest rates in interbank 
markets (LIBOR) and the three-month T-bill interest rate. The LIBOR-OIS spread shows difference between the 
interest rates on interbank loans and the expected average base rate during the coming period. As such, both 
measures can be viewed as indication of banks' perception on the risk and liquidity conditions in the money market. 
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Chart 2-2 Fed’s interest rate target vs. three-month USD interbank and government securities market yields 
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Chart 2-3 ECB base rate vs. three-month EUR interbank and government securities market yields 
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In line with the above, central banks continued to shift their policy towards easing the monetary 
stance and lending conditions. This is manifested in further rate cuts on the one hand, and the 
increasing use of a set of unconventional expansive policy tools on the other hand. In line with 
market expectations, the Fed has not modified the 0%-0.25% Fed funds target rate band in 
recent months. Consistent with the press releases following the announcements, quotes for Fed 
funds futures contracts point to a long-term maintenance of current interest conditions, with the 
market expecting the first moderate interest rate raise to take place in November at the earliest. 
In line with expectations, the ECB cut its base rate by 50 basis points in March and by 25 basis 
points in April, which was below the market consensus, to be followed by an expected additional 
cut by 25 basis points in May. At the same time it narrowed the corridor around the rate of the 
main refinancing operations to +/-75 basis points, and extended the maximum maturity of loans 
from six months to 1 year, through which the ECB provides unlimited liquidity. The Swiss 
National Bank decided to lower the top of the interest rate corridor by 25 basis points to 0.75%, 
and set the three-month LIBOR interest rate target at 0.25%. Somewhat unexpectedly, the 
interest rate decision was complemented by a number of unconventional measures (increasing 
interbank liquidity through repo transactions, FX market intervention, and corporate bond 
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purchases). In addition, the central banks of several other developed countries (Bank of England, 
Bank of Canada, the central banks of New Zealand, Australia and Norway) followed suit and 
lowered their interest rates. 
In the absence of further room for interest rate cut manoeuvres, the Fed, the Bank of England 
and the Bank of Japan resorted to a practice of active quantitative easing under different 
instrument purchase schemes. However, these differed significantly in terms of the volume and 
types of instruments purchased. The ECB, on its part, made a decision at its May meeting on the 
use of alternative instruments and accordingly, the ECB is to purchase 60 billion euro worth of 
EUR-denominated covered bonds issued in the euro area. 
At the beginning of 2009, as the issuance of sovereign bonds increased, so did the credit risk of 
developed countries, which resulted in significantly higher CDS and sovereign bond risk premia. 
In contrast, recent months have seen a decline in yields on government securities in most 
developed markets, while concerns regarding peripheral euro area member states have eased. 
Improving investor sentiment is reflected by the developments in CDS spreads as well: in the 
case of low risk developed countries, CDS spreads decreased by 20-50 basis points, while a 
decrease of 60-80 basis points was observed for higher risk countries. While growth in demand 
for higher risk, high-yield investment options was evident, yields on three-month US discount 
Treasury bills, which are considered as the safest investment, finally departed from around zero 
percent where they were stuck in January and fluctuated in the upper side of the Fed funds target 
band. 
Asset price developments in emerging markets 
The negative global investor sentiment characterising the beginning of the period had an adverse 
impact on emerging markets as well, and had a devastating effect on Central East European 
countries in particular. Along with increased volatility, foreign currencies in the region 
depreciated substantially by the beginning of March. As the extent of the weakening reflected risk 
perception departing from fundamentals, in response central banks in the region committed 
themselves to stabilising their respective currencies through coordinated as well as individual 
actions. Even though verbal interventions succeeded in easing the pressure on foreign currencies, 
concerns about the exposure of Western European banks in the region reinforced the already 
negative perception of the region. 
The perception of the region has changed favourably in the wake of the announcement of several 
supranational development banks (EIB, World Bank, EBRD) at the end of February on setting 
up a credit facility in the amount of EUR 25 billion to assist Central European firms and financial 
institutions. In addition, the positive effect of the favourable turn observed in developed markets 
from the middle of March eventually reached emerging markets as well. Regional and country-
specific factors (Polish and Hungarian verbal intervention, IMF-led aid package to Romania, 
Poland’s option of using the flexible credit line facility of the IMF) reinforced the impact of the 
optimistic global climate. As a result, the risk perception associated with the region improved, 
asset prices and stock exchange indices started to rise, risk premia declined and exchange rates 
appreciated. With increasing risk appetite and decreasing exchange rate volatility, investment 
strategies capitalising on the interest rate differentials (carry-trade positions) may return into 
focus. 
The results of the G-20 summit gave a further boost to the improving attitude on the emerging 
markets. Most of the funds made available for the IMF are intended to make emerging countries 
less vulnerable to shocks. In addition to the freshly announced FCL instrument, Mexico’s and 
Poland’s announcement of their intentions to seek loans under the credit line were met with a 
positive market reception. The region as a whole was affected positively when the IMF admitted 
that the calculations it had published in April regarding the short-term financing needs of Central 
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and Eastern European economies were incorrect and suggested a significantly more negative 
picture than would have been realistic. Taking advantage of the improving investor perception of 
CEE economies, certain countries in the region (Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia) managed to 
again sell considerable quantities of EUR-denominated benchmark bonds in international capital 
markets. The issues were substantially oversubscribed, but the deals were priced with relatively 
high spreads over mid-swap. 
Declining CDS spreads, which have been observed since the middle of March, also reflect the 
improving perception of the Central and Eastern European region. While in terms of foreign 
currency exchange rates, the region did not significantly surpass the performance of the Latin 
American and South-East Asian emerging markets, it in fact did register better performance in 
respect of improvement in CDSs. While those two regions experienced a decline by 100-200 
basis points compared to the peeks observed in early March, default premia fell by 250-500 basis 
points in the CEE region. At the same time, the level of the average CDS premium in the CEE 
region still exceeds the values prevailing in the other two regions. The decline in risk premia took 
place despite several sovereign debt rating downgrades in the region in recent months. Although 
it is still typical of emerging markets that easing policy measures would be justified according to 
the poor growth prospects, central banks are undoubtedly restrained in cutting their rates by the 
considerable risk of new weakening waves in the exchange rate of the region’s currencies, the 
high exchange rate volatility and the financial stability risk concerning the banking system. 
Chart 2-4 Changes in the exchange rates of currencies in the region* 
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*Changes in percentages, 1 January 2009 = 0; a positive value indicates a devaluation of the local currency. 
Chart 2-5 Developments in CDS spreads in certain emerging countries 
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Improving trends in domestic financial markets 
Over the last three months, despite the persistent problems, a number of fundamentally 
favourable trends have been observed in the Hungarian financial markets, and turmoil has 
continued to subside gradually. Besides maintaining its previously introduced instruments, the 
MNB introduced further foreign currency liquidity providing instruments to assist banks in 
obtaining longer-term foreign exchange funds or ensure banks’ access to such, and in order to 
make certain instruments more attractive to banks, it modified the related conditions. With these 
measures, the central bank continues to provide assistance in the liquidity management of the 
Hungarian banking sector. 
The steps taken by the MNB to provide forint liquidity proved successful, and the interbank 
depo market essentially resumed normal operation. Primary liquidity reallocation is performed in 
the unsecured forint interbank market, while simultaneous recourse to the deposit and lending 
facilities of the MNB has been very rare in recent months. As a result of excess liquidity in the 
sector, interbank yields typically resided in the lower section of the interest rate corridor. In the 
case of individual liquidity tensions, the two-week lending facility of the MNB provides an 
adequate and favourable option for managing liquidity issues, and banks apparently make use of 
this opportunity if needed. This is supported by the fact that rather than using this tool to roll 
over a fixed principal amount, they typically take two-week loans in the amount required for their 
current liquidity needs. 
Besides the consolidation of forint liquidity allocation, access to foreign exchange liquidity has 
become cheaper and easier, contributing to continuing improvement in conditions on the FX 
swap market. Implied forint yields along short-term maturities typically resided near the interest 
rate corridor, which primarily reflected a more active recourse to the overnight central bank FX-
swap line. This was facilitated by the central bank’s pricing policy, which has become increasingly 
favourable for counterparties. The two-way O/N FX-swap tender was aimed at resolving the 
partner limit problems of credit institutions, but due to the elimination of the limit problems and 
the fact that the pricing of the subsequently introduced one-way FX-swap line providing euro 
liquidity approached the market price, recourse to the two-way instrument practically came to a 
halt. Thus, its maintenance became pointless, and the MNB decided to discontinue its use. 
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In March, the MNB introduced new FX-swap tools to provide longer-term euro liquidity. Seven 
banks submitted bids for the six-month tender, which had tighter conditions, and the MNB 
concluded bilateral agreements with each of them. In addition, the MNB announced a three-
month FX-swap tender as well, which can be used with more favourable conditions, although it 
is somewhat more expensive. The introduction and continuous announcement of longer-term 
central bank FX-swap instruments also contributed to an increase in implied forint yields, and as 
a result, in recent months their yields have gradually approached the benchmark forint market 
yields at the corresponding maturities even for longer maturities (3, 6 and 12 months). While the 
use of longer-term central bank FX-swap instruments fell behind the anticipated level, this 
primarily reflects more favourable liquidity conditions on the one hand, and on the other hand, it 
may be attributed to the fact that market agents tend to use these instruments as a last resort. 
Banks use the one-week CHF/EUR tender continuously, essentially for rolling over previously 
drawn loan amounts. Along with other modifications to central bank tools, at the end of April it 
was announced that the above tool would be maintained by the relevant central banks at least 
until July 2009. On the whole, the previously experienced turmoil in the FX-swap market has 
largely subsided. 
Chart 2-6 Recourse to new central bank FX-swap facilities* 
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During the period under review, the forint exchange rate continued to move within an extremely 
wide range and was highly volatile. Following publication of the previous Report, the forint 
continued to depreciate, falling to an unprecedented low level at the beginning of March as a 
result of several waves of weakening. The MNB responded to the depreciation with a firm 
statement, in which it declared that the central bank was prepared to use all available means to 
defend the forint. At the same time, it was announced that the central bank would start 
introducing EU funds to the market. As a further boost to the forint, a separate press release was 
issued shortly thereafter, which stated the specific amounts available. Later in March the 
EUR/HUF exchange rate stabilised somewhat at around 300, the depreciation trend came to a 
halt and in April, driven by the improved international climate combined with increasing risk 
appetite, the Hungarian currency appreciated significantly, and at the beginning of May it was 
able to drop below 280. Nevertheless, as several market agents have pointed out, in the 
assessment of these developments it should be also noted that the forint FX market turnover was 
rather low in the previous period, and all exchange rate movements took place in a highly illiquid 
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market. For the time being, option quotes failed to reflect a shift towards more positive exchange 
rate expectations. 
Chart 2-7 Developments in the forint/euro exchange rate 
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In the secondary government securities market yields rose to historical highs in early March while 
liquidity was extremely low, and the market came under strong selling pressure. Subsequently, the 
improving market climate and the appreciation of the forint led to an extremely intense decline in 
yields along the entire length of the yield curve. As a result, by the end of April secondary market 
yields fell by a total of 100-200 basis points for maturities under one year, while yields fell even 
more dramatically around the middle of the yield curve, declining by 190-370 basis points. It 
should be noted that this decline in yields was not only linked to fundamental factors. In fact, in 
order to alleviate tensions on the supply side, the Government Debt Management Agency (ÁKK) 
conducted several high-value bond buy-back actions from the middle of March, which put some 
artificial downward pressure on yields. On the one hand, with this measure the Debt 
Management Agency intended to provide a regulated framework under which the (partially 
hidden) excess supply would be withdrawn from the market, as it was hindering the normal 
operation of the government security market; at the same time this measure served to reduce the 
volume of debt. Following the announcement in the middle of March, by the middle of May the 
ÁKK had repurchased government bonds maturing between 2009-2012 with a nominal value of 
HUF 480 billion, taking advantage of the international bail-out package to finance the 
transactions. Secondary market liquidity improved and turnover increased slightly, while interest 
rate swap spreads – which are also reliable indicators of the liquidity position of the market – 
decreased significantly, particularly for short maturities. However, the liquidity of secondary 
government security market is still low. 
The fact that uncertainties regarding bond issues dissipated should be highlighted as an important 
development in the primary government security market; at the end of April the ÁKK resumed 
its practice of conducting regular government bond auctions. According to the press release on 
the new auctions, the Debt Management Agency will initially offer bonds every two weeks in 
relatively small amounts at three maturities (3, 5 and 10 years). In addition, from May the ÁKK 
will use more flexible bond issuance methods to supplement its normal auction issuance which, 
in the case of strong demand, will enable investors to buy more of the same government bonds at 
the average auction price after the auction. The Treasury Bill (DKJ) auctions conducted in recent 
months have been characterised by high demand and decreasing yields. In view of the 
considerable amount of oversubscribing, the ÁKK increased the amount of T-bills issued several 
times, and the average auction yields have gradually approached secondary market yields. 
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Regarding the other measures of the debt agency, buy-back auctions will continue, supplemented 
by new, bond switch auctions. The volume of bought-back bond stock gradually decreased in the 
repurchase auctions, and compared to the large initial volumes (60-70 billion HUF worth of 
government bonds) the ÁKK accepted offers only in limited quantities (20-30 billion HUF) by 
the end of the period. 
The government security portfolio of non-residents has decreased by HUF 215 billion since the 
end of February, of which a net sum of HUF 150 billion in sales was related to secondary market 
transactions. The contribution of maturing T-bills and bonds to the decline was nearly HUF 105 
billion, while non-residents bought HUF 40 billion worth of Hungarian T-bills and bonds in the 
primary market through auctions. However, the decline in the government security stock held by 
non-residents was parallel with a substantial decrease in the total outstanding HUF-denominated 
government bond portfolio, and the ratio of foreigners’ holdings from the total government 
security portfolio remained at a relatively stable level during the last months. Moreover, having a 
look at non-residents’ holdings by tenor, the foreigners were net sellers mainly on short 
maturities, while on longer terms the level of their holdings stagnated or even increased in the 
case of bonds with the longest time to maturity, which resulted in a longer average time to 
maturity of foreigners’ government security portfolio. 
The forint positions of non-resident investors have increased by HUF 550 billion since the end 
of February, while the volume of their FX-swap contracts decreased by a comparable amount. 
This may suggest that – even though they were absent from the government security market – 
non-resident investors increasingly closed their positions against the forint in the FX market and 
opened positions in forint. (From the beginning of the year until early March a great number of 
speculative positions were taken up against the forint. The decline in the net FX-swap portfolio 
held by non-residents is largely due to the elimination of these positions). 
In recent years, the forward holdings of domestic non-bank market participants have consistently 
moved in tandem with the forint exchange rate, but this relationship started to shift from the 
beginning of 2009. On the one hand, there was a shift in the levels of the two time series: this 
time the weakening of the exchange rate was not followed by an increase in the portfolio, which 
in turn would have bolstered the forint exchange rate. On the other hand, the coefficient of this 
relationship has changed as well: the impact of exchange rate changes has grown considerably 
less significant. Nevertheless, a certain measure of correlation has been observed between their 
movements, albeit to a lesser degree. 
Reflecting the steady deterioration in the risk perception of Hungary, following a period of 
growth which began at the end of last year, the five-year sovereign CDS spread peaked at 638 
basis points – a historical high – on 9 March. Reflecting the turnaround in the global investor 
climate and the overall perception of the region, there was a decline in the sovereign CDS premia 
in the middle of March, but the extent of this drop was lower than that observed in countries 
previously associated with the same risk level as Hungary. Although the price of the insurance on 
credit default decreased to around 320 basis points by the middle of May, the relative position of 
Hungary has clearly deteriorated in this regard during the last three months. By the end of April, 
several countries (Bulgaria, Romania, Russia) had a much more favourable CDS spread than 
Hungary, while at the beginning of March their risk premia were higher. Currently, Hungary is 
nearly on par with Estonia, while the difference between them was over 100 basis points only few 
months ago. 
In February, the MNB discontinued the cycle of rate cuts that it had started in November 2008 
and decided to leave the central bank key interest rate unchanged at the subsequent two policy 
meetings as well. Primarily influenced by the exchange rate, expectations regarding the interest 
rate path have varied widely during the previous period. After several waves of exchange rate 
depreciation, in February and March market agents considered a massive rate increase and the 
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maintenance of the existing rate as equally likely scenarios, and the probability factors associated 
with each scenario depended mainly on expected exchange rate developments. After hitting 
bottom at the beginning of March, the exchange rate returned to a level of around EUR/HUF 
300, before – following several attempts – it strengthened to a range between EUR/HUF 280-
290. In line with these developments, expectations of an interest rate increase have gradually 
declined, and were subsequently priced out altogether. Based on asset prices, the market currently 
expects the interest rate to be maintained for the following months, while forward interest rate 
quotes have started to suggest the possibility of a slight rate cut over a 3- to 6-month horizon. 
Market prices indicate that the central bank base rate may be lowered to 8.5% by the end of the 
year, and 7% by the end of 2010. 
Chart 2-8 Future path of the two-week base rate as implied by money market yields 
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While there has been significant improvement in the functionality of Hungarian financial markets 
since the previous Report, normal business operations have not been restored yet. The liquidity of 
most market segments is still below the levels observed in the periods prior to the turbulence in 
October. Moreover, certain markets (spot FX market, HUF government securities market) are 
still characterised by low liquidity. At the same time, the yield levels of certain market segments 
have become less inconsistent: short-term yields of government securities market and interbank 
lending market, as well as implied yields from FX-swap transactions and FRA quotes have 
approximated each other, and fluctuated within or near the interest rate corridor. Central bank 
measures have in fact largely contributed to a more efficient orientation of yield levels. 
Appreciating real exchange rate, declining real interest, tightening lending conditions 
Looking at developments in monetary conditions, it is still true that under the current conditions, 
‘traditional’ indices such as real exchange rates and real interest rates do not fully reflect the 
tightness of monetary conditions. While the real interest rate declined considerably, the real 
exchange rate strengthened significantly, surpassing the notable depreciation experienced during 
the preceding two months, and non-price factors of lending continue to point to an obvious 
tightening in credit conditions. 
The forward-looking real interest rate increased in February and March before falling sharply in 
April. The value of the index was mainly driven by developments in the nominal yield level: the 
increase observed at the beginning of the period was triggered by an unexpectedly steep increase 
in one-year government security market yields, which surpassed the slightly increasing inflation 
expectations. The subsequent positive turn in the government security market was accompanied 
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by a substantial decline in yields, which was due to a combination of more optimistic global 
investor sentiment, the improving risk perception of the region, and the yield restraining effect of 
the buy-back auctions conducted by the ÁKK. Meanwhile, inflation expectations started to 
increase slightly again, thus both factors put downward pressure on the real interest rate. After six 
months – for the first time since the turmoil in October – the index again dropped below 6%; 
however, it is still well above the long-term average. 
Developments in the real exchange rate are determined by the nominal forint exchange rate, 
which significantly depreciated in the first few months of the year. However, the strengthening 
experienced during March and April surpassed this effect, so on the whole, real appreciation 
occurred. Inflation in Hungary has continued to exceed the level observed in the euro area in 
recent months, thus the effect of the positive inflation differential slightly moderated the 
depreciation of the real exchange rate in the first half of the examined period, while it facilitated 
appreciation during April. 
Trends observed in the lending process continue to be a primary indicator of tighter monetary 
conditions: banks’ willingness to lend has not improved, and price and non-price lending 
conditions (e.g. downpayment, loan-to-value ratio, required credit score) underwent more 
tightening. 
Chart 2-9 Developments in monetary conditions* 
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*In the case of real exchange rate increasing values indicate a real appreciation. 
 
 
Continuing decline in bank lending 
Bank lending activity and loan demand continued to decrease in the last quarter. Real economic 
developments suggest deceleration in lending activity, but the decline in the lending path has 
been steeper since the default of Lehman Brothers than would have been warranted by the 
macroeconomic developments alone. Based on the experiences of previous financial crises, 
lending activity may remain subdued over the long run, and the recovery is expected to be slow. 
Negative developments in the corporate sector may be compounded by restrained credit supply 
in particular, putting downward pressure on economic growth. 
In 2009 Q1, the volume of the loan portfolio of the non-financial corporate sector continued to 
decline. The decline was more pronounced in the case of short-term loans (with an agreed 
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maturity of up to one year) than for loans with longer maturities. At the same time, banks 
registered increased demand for short-term loans. Based on this it can be stated that for short-
term loans loan supply factors have contributed to the decline in loan flows. 
In terms of denomination, the decline primarily affected forint loans, while FX borrowing 
remained positive, but was more restrained than before. Banks participating in the Lending 
Survey conducted in March 2009 reported a significant tightening in lending supply, the reasons 
of which were not exclusively supply side factors: some of them were related to customers’ 
creditworthiness. At the same time, banks experienced an increase in credit demand, particularly 
in the case of short-term loans. The assumption that FX loans continue to play a crucial role is 
supported by two facts: first, the interest rate on euro-denominated corporate loans – which 
dominate new borrowing of FX loans – has declined, because the impact of rising risk premia 
was overcompensated by the gradual decrease in the ECB base rates. Second, although corporate 
loans with a state subsidy may be disbursed in forint primarily, their impact has not yet been 
reflected by the data available, and may become apparent only in the coming quarters. 
Chart 2-10 Net quarterly flow of the corporate loans of the domestic bank sector*                
(seasonally adjusted data) 
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Households’ borrowing dynamics have also continued to weaken since November 2008. 
Borrowing remained positive in the first few months of 2009, but dropped to the level observed 
in 2001 (i.e. before the surge in household borrowing). Triggered by a sharp fall in FX loans, the 
decline in consumer credit was unexpected and massive, which was only partially offset by a 
moderate increase in forint-denominated loans. At the same time, in the case of housing loans 
net outflows have gradually subsided. In terms of denomination, forint loans continue to decline 
at the same pace, while FX borrowing has turned positive, but still remained significantly below 
the previous levels. Overall, the decline in net borrowing reflects a continued tightening in 
lending conditions and falling credit demand, while the effect of the weak forint exchange rate 
observed in Q1 has not encouraged FX borrowing. 
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Chart 2-61 Net quarterly flow of the household loans of the domestic bank sector*          
(seasonally adjusted data) 
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3. Inflation and real economic outlook 
 
This year, the Hungarian economy faces a recession of nearly 7%, which is deeper than 
previously expected and unprecedented since the early 1990s. According to our forecast for the 
coming nearly three years, recovery will be a protracted process: the economy is expected to 
continue to decline next year, although at a slower pace, and growth will only turn positive again 
in 2011. Provided that our usual fundamental assumptions hold true, inflation will grow 
significantly compared to the level close to price stability as a result of indirect tax increases in the 
second half of the year. From 2010 H2, we again expect low inflation below the 3% target until 
the end of our forecast period, as the direct impact of tax increases will not be included in the 
price index, and the fall in demand as well as the labour cost-reducing effect of tax restructurings 
will become dominant.6 
 
Box 3-1 Basic assumptions of our forecast 
In line with the practice adopted in the previous issues of the Report, we build our current 
forecast on rule-based, fixed assumptions regarding the expected path of the base rate, the 
EUR/HUF exchange rate and oil prices. In accordance with our earlier practices, we used the 
average values of the month preceding publication, i.e. the April averages on this occasion. 
Table 3–1 Changes in our basic assumptions compared with the February Report 
February 2009 May 2009 Change compared with February (%)
2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011
Central bank base rate (per cent)** 9,5 9,5 - 9,5 9,5 9,5 0 0 -
HUF/EUR 289,7 290,6 - 294,9 295,1 295,1 1,8 1,6 -
USD/EUR (cent) 129,7 129,5 - 131,5 131,9 131,9 1,3 1,9 -
BRENT oil price (USD/barrel) 49,4 57,9 - 52,0 62,2 67,4 5,2 7,4 -
BRENT oil price (EUR/barrel) 38,1 44,7 - 39,5 47,1 51,1 3,7 5,5 -
BRENT oil price (HUF/barrel) 11 047 12 983 - 11 662 13 904 15 077 5,6 7,1 -
 
Compared to recent quarters, there has been no considerable change in our basic assumptions in 
comparison with the previous Report. The base rate did not change in the last quarter, remaining 
at 9.5% since January. The EUR/HUF and the EUR/USD exchange rates are approximately one 
and a half per cent weaker, while oil prices in euro are around five per cent higher. The fall in oil 
prices observed in 2008 H2 was followed by a mild increase in recent months. It is worth noting 
that according to long-term futures prices the oil path will remain upward-sloping until 2011. 
 
Deep recession and gradual recovery from 2010 
The effects of the financial crisis have dominated domestic and international macroeconomic 
forecasts since last autumn: as a result of the global loss of confidence and the fall in international 
                                                 
6 The projections are based on information available up to 20 May c.o.b. 
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trade turnover and industrial production, the prospects for this year deteriorated from month to 
month in developed economies as well (Chart 1). 
Chart 3-1 Changes in the forecasts for growth in the euro area in 2009 (forecasts of the IMF, OECD, ECB 
and the European Commission) 
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At the same time, as already mentioned in the first chapter, the latest information from recent 
weeks suggest that the positive effects of the wide-ranging economic policy interventions are 
becoming tangible, and the world economy may be approaching the turning point in the 
economic cycle. Accordingly, the recovery will start from a level lower than expected earlier, but 
the rate of economic contraction should decelerate significantly in the second half of the year. 
These favourable signs are even less apparent in the actual data, although they can already be 
traced in economic agents’ expectations, the rise of major stock exchanges and in euro area – 
especially German – confidence indicators, which are decisive in terms of Hungarian exports. 
However, it is important to add that for the time being the favourable indicators should be 
treated with caution. On the one hand, the appearance of risks in both directions, i.e. upward and 
downward risks, only represents a significant shift when one compares this with the one-way, 
downside cyclical risks that have been dominant in earlier months; in its own right, this will not 
necessary lead to a recovery of the global economy from the crisis. On the other hand, based on 
the experience of earlier recessions, downturns caused by bank crises and ones which affect 
several regions are deeper and longer than average.7 As both properties are typical of the current 
global economic recession, the most recent forecasts (e.g. IMF, OECD, European Commission) 
only project a slow recovery starting in 2010. 
Slow consolidation is also justified by the persistence of uncertainties surrounding the ‘health’ of 
the financial sector. According to numerous analyses, financial intermediation is only expected to 
return to normal in developed economies next year, following the write-off of the actual losses. 
In this international environment, Hungary’s external demand may gradually pick up from 2010 
H2, following an 11% decline this year. Resulting from the structure of Hungarian exports, 
developments in Hungary’s market share are procyclical, i.e. the slump in the country’s exports 
exceeds the decline experienced by Hungary’s trading partners. This effect will be dominant in 
2009. In addition to the developments in external business conditions, changes in the real 
                                                 
7 See: ‘From Recession to Recovery: How Soon and How Strong?’ In: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2009: Crisis 
and Recovery, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C. (Chapter 3, pp. 103–138). 
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exchange rate also have a substantial impact on Hungary’s exports and market share. As a result 
of the depreciation of the nominal exchange rate in recent months, real exchange rate indicators 
weakened considerably, and on the basis of the government measures and the planned reduction 
of labour costs, the real exchange rate based on the unit labour cost may continue to improve 
over our forecast period, contributing to an increase in Hungary’s market share. Looking ahead, 
following this year’s low, the growth rate of Hungarian exports is expected to pick up as a result 
of improving external business conditions and a weaker real exchange rate. 
 
Chart 3-2 Real exchange rate and market share* 
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   * Positive values indicate real depreciation. 
In a regional comparison it can be established that the downturn in the Hungarian economy in 
2009 and 2010 will be more severe than the average in the neighbouring countries or the slump 
expected in the EU as a whole. The greater decline is explained by domestic factors: the 
procyclical fiscal policy and the decline in lending by the banking sector, which is dependent on 
external funding. However, compared to the previous year, a relatively strong positive adjustment 
in growth is expected for 2011, which is explained by four main factors. First, as a result of 
strengthening competitiveness, the expansion of Hungary’s export market share may be relatively 
robust. Second, the strongly restrictive character of the budget will not be effective by 2011, 
furthermore, due to the improvement in competitiveness, the growth enhancing effect will 
dominate. Third, as a result of surplus capacities accumulating in the economy, inflation may also 
be very low. This latter factor, coupled with improving external business conditions, allows a 
strong growth in real income. Finally, banks’ lending activity – which is expected to become 
stronger, though will remain below pre-crisis level – also contributes to the gradual closing of the 
negative output gap (chart 3-3), which has been widening for a long time. 
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Chart 3-3.: Growth path, output gap 
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Box 3-2 Government measures and their macroeconomic effects 
When the version of the Quarterly Report on Inflation was being prepared, no detailed package of 
fiscal measures beyond this year was available to the authors. Therefore, while our calculations 
for 2009 were based on the valid budget as well as the submitted and partly adopted bills, our 
projection for 2010 is based on the government’s crisis management plans, and for 2011 we have 
made technical projections. As the government measures described in the February issue of the 
Quarterly Report on Inflation were not adopted in recent months, the measures continue to be 
quantified compared to our November Report. Overall, the following measures were taken into 
account in our Report: 
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Measures taken into consideration in the forecast compared to the situation in November 
2008* 
 2009 2010 2011
Expenditure side measures (bliion HUF)  
Financial transfers to 
households -166 -368 -437
Government consumption -63 -103 -103
Government investment 0 -160 -125
Transfers in kind -50 -112 -112
Wage freeze 0 -70 -70
Other -57 -37 -37
Overall -336 -850 -884
Revenue side measures 
Employer’s labour taxes -91 -300 - 
Employee’s labour taxes -41 -238 - 
Capital taxes -2 -25 - 
Consumption taxes 173 411 - 
Wealth tax+levy+fringe 
benefit 0 137 - 
Overall net effect o 39 -15 - 
  
* The base of comparison of the expenditure-reducing steps is the government’s December 2008 Convergence 
Report, while in case of revenue-side measures we only present new measures compared to the ones accounted in 
the November Report. 
As shown, on the expenditure side the measures basically restrict financial transfers to 
households. However, the measures also include the dismantling of price subsidies and the 
freezing of civil servants’ wages. 
On the tax side, the direction of the measures is basically tax restructuring: the increase in indirect 
and wealth taxes and the termination of some tax exemptions finance the reduction of taxes on 
labour (social insurance burdens + personal income tax), but overall the tax package can rather 
be considered as minor tightening in terms of total tax revenue. 
Macroeconomic effects 
Both the reduction of transfers to households and the increase in indirect taxes reduce 
households’ disposable income, which may result in a decline in households’ consumption and 
investment expenditures. At the same time, cutting the taxes on labour ceteris paribus improves the 
profitability of the corporate sector. We expect that over the short run companies will use 
approximately 2/3 of the decline in labour costs to restore their historically very low level of 
profitability, and will let employees have only 1/3 of the additional income. As the adjustment 
has a negative effect on growth prospects, which also impairs the creation of jobs, compared to 
the baseline scenario, a substantial increase in employment is expected only in 2011. The 
improvement in competitiveness resulting from the reduction in the tax wedge on labour 
stimulates investment and adds to the profitability of exports as well. These effects will be felt 
strongly in 2011, when the demand-reducing measures and the increase in indirect taxes will no 
longer affect the developments in household expenditure. 
Long-term effects of the fiscal package on growth 
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There is an ongoing debate in the international literature over the short and long-term effects of 
fiscal adjustments. Depending on the structure in which such adjustments are implemented, 
significant differences may exist in terms of the short and long-term effects. Moreover, it is also 
debated whether they act as a drag on economic activity in the short term. These issues are 
discussed in detail by Horváth et al (2006).8 
In connection with the fiscal measures recently announced by the government, this box briefly 
describes the economic effects of the various measures and provides a quantitative estimate of 
their impact on growth. The values are based on the results from simulations of two of the 
Bank’s macroeconomic models. The list below contains the measures and impact mechanisms 
taken into account for the purpose of the simulations. 
- The narrowing in the tax wedge due to the reduction in personal income tax and social 
security contributions will provide an opportunity to increase employment. 
- However, higher VAT and excise tax rates will exert downward pressure on demand for a 
prolonged period. In addition, they will trigger a shift in relative prices: export goods will 
become cheaper relative to domestic products, which, in turn, will stimulate exports. 
- The reduction in cash transfers will lead to a decline in consumption even in the short term. 
Over the longer-term, however, they will encourage employment. Changes in the rules for 
child care allowances and retirement benefits will increase activity directly, but their short-
term effects will be marginal, due to their delayed implementation. 
- A successful adjustment may have other favourable effects: it can reduce country risk, place 
the economy on a sustainable path, which, in turn, may boost capital flows and domestic 
capital investment. International experience has shown that the coordinated behaviour of 
labour market participants may help firms to have a smaller decline in profits, by committing 
themselves to retain more jobs. Consequently, the costs of firing, re-hiring and training could 
be saved. This latter effect has not been taken into account in these calculations. 
However, the impact mechanisms presented above only occur if agents regard the adjustment as 
a permanent change, which will significantly reduce taxes on primary (labour and capital) 
incomes. Otherwise, stronger future growth will not compensate for the short-term growth 
sacrifices. 
In summary, assuming, as in Engen – Skinner (1996)9, that the effects of the measures are spread 
evenly over 10 years, the potential growth rate may increase by up to 0.4% annually, half of which 
will result from the effects on activity and employment of the measures to stimulate the labour 
market. The remaining part can be attributed mainly to a rise in the capital stock. It is important 
to note however, that in respect of their effects on employment and economic growth, the 
changes in personal income taxes have not been implemented in an optimal manner: the personal 
income tax has been reduced the most in income groups where the flexibility of legal labour 
supply is relatively low. Overall it can be argued, that with a different PITsystem (lower marginal 
tax rate for higher, higher marginal tax rate for middle-level  wages earners) the overall effect on 
growth could have been increased.10 
With regard to the expected path of lending, we are even more pessimistic than previously. The 
underlying reason is that, according to international experiences, following a financial crisis, 
lending dynamics pick up only very slowly, after several years of stagnation. Consequently, for 
2011 we expect a significantly slower credit expansion than the dynamics preceding the crisis. 
Among the effects of government measures described in detail in the box above, tightening 
demand is the one which has the strongest impact over the short run. Over the medium term 
                                                 
8 Horváth et al. (2006) „Macroeffects of fiscal adjustment in Hungary”, MNB Studies 52 
9 See Enger-Skinner (1996) „Taxation and Economic Growth” NBER Working papers 5826  
10 See Kátay et al. (2009) „ The causes and consequences of low activity and employment rate in Hungary” MNB 
Study 79. 
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(from 2011 on), however, the favourable effect of tax restructuring may dominate, which will 
primarily appear through the labour market. 
All these factors indicate an extremely deep, nearly 7% economic slowdown for the current year, 
and annual average growth may be negative in 2010 as well. However, in 2011 growth may be 
stronger again, close to the average of the years preceding the crisis. 
Examining individual sectors’ contribution to growth, each factor points to recession this year, 
with the exception of net exports, and an increase in domestic components is only expected from 
2011. 
 
Chart 3-4 Contribution of GDP components to growth 
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As a result of the combined effects of labour market adjustment, the government’s tightening 
measures and the temporary increase in inflation, households are facing a significant decline in 
disposable income this year. Household behaviour in the coming years will not only be 
determined by the decrease in income, as the relationship between income and consumption may 
also change compared to previous years. Looking ahead, as opposed to recent years’ abundance 
of loans, the drop in consumption is expected to exceed the decline in income. Households will 
have much more limited opportunities to smooth their consumption through borrowing, and as a 
result of the increasing economic uncertainty and fear of lay-offs, precautionary savings will also 
increase. Accordingly, in 2009 and 2010 the decline in consumption will be almost twice as large 
as the decline in disposable income. This also means that according to our forecast, the 
consumption rate as a proportion of disposable income will decline until 2010 by nearly 6 
percentage points from the peak at end-2007. Then, following some slight increase, it may 
stabilise around a level of 87% in 2011. A significant downturn is projected in household 
investment as well. In H1, this year’s recession will still be attenuated to some extent by demand 
brought forward due to the termination of state subsidies on house purchase, but after this effect 
fades away no adjustment is expected until 2011. Consequently, the level of household 
investment, which is mainly in the housing market, may be approximately 30% lower than in 
2007, which was characterised by vigorous loan dynamics. 
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Chart 3-5 Household income 
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The decline in investment may not only be restricted to the household sector. Corporate sector 
investment has also been hit by the subdued external prospects and financing difficulties, as well 
as the increasing general economic uncertainty. In addition to individual investments which are 
also significant at the macroeconomic level, both corporate and government sector investments 
may be stimulated by better utilisation of development funds received from the EU. Overall, 
investment dynamics may show a decline of around 10% this year, exceeding the rate of decline 
in GDP. Modest growth is expected from next year on, and a more vigorous pick-up in 2011. 
In the current situation, near the bottom of the trough, there is considerable uncertainty about 
the longer-term prospects. Nevertheless, we think that during the economic crisis so much 
capacity will be freed up that starting from 2011, in an international environment becoming more 
favourable, strong adjustment is expected in capacity utilisation, serving as a foundation for 
economic growth above 3%. This rate cannot be considered historically high, but in line with 
economic logic it already allows the start of the closure of the negative output gap accumulated 
between 2007 and 2010. The reduction of the tax wedge on labour and the permanently weak 
forint exchange rate together foster export competitiveness, which may result in a relatively 
strong expansion of Hungary’s export market share in an accelerating global economy. In 
addition, the strongly restrictive character of the budget will not be effective by 2011. Owing to 
the surplus capacities accumulating in the economy, inflation may be very low, which, in addition 
to the improving external business conditions, allows for strong increases in real income. Finally, 
banks’ lending activity, which is expected to grow stronger, also contributes to the gradual closing 
of the negative output gap, which has been widening for quite some time. 
Pronounced labour market adjustment: mass lay-offs, low wage dynamics 
 
In the Hungarian economy, the crisis has caused the strong changes on the labour market. As a 
result of the decline in production and value added, companies face a significant need to adapt, 
pushing to use all the available labour market channels to the maximum extent in the coming 
quarters. Starting from 2010, the need to adapt stemming from market developments may be 
reduced by the decline in spending cuts by the government, but the measures entering into force 
this year will only contribute to the reinforcement of the profitability situation of the corporate 
sector to a minor extent. 
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Companies are mainly trying to adjust to the deteriorating sales prospects by reducing 
employment and wages. Although labour demand and supply may gradually pick up as a result of 
government measures, the unfavourable effects of the strong recession will dominate over the 
short run. Consequently, no clear-cut increase in the number of employed is expected until end-
2010 or early 2011. Overall, we expect lay-offs on a magnitude of 180,000 people in 2009–2010, 
which corresponds to nearly 5% of the total number of employed. In the area of labour 
utilisation, in addition to adjustment via the number of employed, the corporate sector can also 
adjust in the number of hours worked, albeit to a smaller extent.11 Regarding the timing of 
developments in the number of employed, more significant lay-offs are expected in the first 
quarters. It was observed in earlier periods that following staff cuts, only approximately one half 
of those dismissed appeared as unemployed, while the other half left the labour market and 
became inactive. By contrast, Q1 workforce figures show that those dismissed have a stronger 
relationship with the labour market, so most of them added to the number of unemployed. All in 
all, in contrast with the earlier trends, we expect that 2/3 of those who lose their jobs will appear 
as registered unemployed. Consequently, the unemployment rate may increase above 11%. The 
higher unemployed ratio among those losing their jobs can be explained by the fact that recently 
mostly main earners lose their jobs, and those who have been closely linked to the labour market 
for a longer period. 
Wage dynamics will also be determined by the need to adjust in the coming years. One important 
difference compared to workforce adjustment is that freezing wages represents a strong lower 
limit because of the rigidity of nominal wages. Our current expectation is that wage dynamics in 
the competitive sector this year will be positive only as a result of the pass-through effects and 
the changes in the composition of the workforce, i.e. there will essentially be wage freezing in the 
private sector as whole. Very low wage dynamics are expected for 2010–2011 as well, but by this 
time the situation in the corporate sector – in large part as a result of the reduction in 
contributions – will allow for a slight increase in nominal wages. However, the oversupply 
stemming from the high unemployment rate will limit any pick-up in wage dynamics. 
As illustrated in Chart 3-6, this year the corporate sector may suffer from significant profit losses 
not seen in previous years, despite the extremely strict labour market adjustment. However, based 
on improving business conditions and the reduction of contributions, tangible improvements in 
profitability will become possible. According to our estimates, approximately one third of the 
savings stemming from the reduction of contributions will be passed on to employees in the 
form of higher gross wages and in employment, i.e. two thirds will add to corporate profitability. 
Overall, we believe that profitability in the competitive sector may approach the level typical of 
the years preceding the financial crisis by 2011. 
                                                 
11 According to the data available to us, since last autumn there has been a downtrend in the per capita number of 
hours worked, and this trend may continue in the near future as well. However, due to the high volatility of monthly 
data, for the time being only tentative conclusions can be drawn regarding future developments in working hours. 
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Chart 3-6 Components of unit labour costs of the private sector 
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Temporary surge in inflation due to tax measures, net inflation below the target 
 
The starting point of our inflation projection is the nearly 3% price indices of the January–April 
period, which correspond to price stability. However, it is important to add to this benign picture 
that inflation declined to 3% as a result of opposing effects stemming from the global economic 
crisis, and even looking forward both downward and upward forces remain significant, adding to 
the uncertainty of the forecast. 
In addition to the inflation effects stemming from macroeconomic developments, similarly to our 
February Report, government measures again affect the trend in inflation significantly: on the one 
hand, through the direct inflation effect of the tax increases (VAT, excise tax) announced by the 
new government, and on the other hand – in an indirect manner – through the business 
conditions and the change in contributions due on labour. 
The EUR/HUF exchange rate has weakened by more than 25% since the summer of 2008, and 
the effect of this exchange rate depreciation appears in the consumer price index gradually. 
According to our estimate, the complete pass-through of an exchange rate shock takes about 5–6 
quarters. Therefore, based on our basic assumption of a fixed exchange rate, the weakening 
which has already taken place will add to the price level until end-2009 or early 2010, to a 
gradually declining extent. The impact of this depreciation is somewhat offset by imported 
inflation, which is lower than in the previous periods, a situation which may, according to 
international forecasts, continue to exist in the coming years as well. 
Whereas the weakening of the exchange rate may have a nearly identical effect on core inflation 
and the overall price index, the effect of the drop in demand may be felt mainly in core inflation 
items. In our forecasts for 2009–2010, we have taken into account the disinflationary effect of 
the negative output gap for a longer time. In parallel with the deterioration of economic 
prospects, this effect may become increasingly pronounced, and in our current forecast we expect 
an disinflationary effect of unprecedented magnitude from this source. In addition to the output 
gap, which is easy to capture in models but difficult to measure in practice, several actual data 
confirm the significant disinflationary effect of shrinking demand. Compared to the values typical 
of earlier years, the month-on-month price indices of market services declined significantly in the 
first quarter. This also conforms to the subdued developments in industrial domestic sales price 
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indices in recent months. The pronounced labour market adjustment, the freezing of wages 
implemented in practically the whole competitive sector and the decline in government wages 
provide further arguments. 
In respect of items outside core inflation, it is worth underlining the indirect effects of lower oil 
prices. On the one hand, owing to the longer delay, the steep fall in oil prices at the end of last 
year will only appear in gas and district heating prices in 2009 H2. On the other hand, the spot 
price of electric energy also declined significantly in international markets in the past half year, 
and our forecast also takes this effect into account in production costs. 
As mentioned before, government measures will have a large impact on inflation in the coming 
quarters. According to our latest information, most of the price measures will come in two larger 
waves: July 2009 (VAT, excise tax) and 2010 January (further excise tax). On top of this, a 
number of other government measures will have an inflationary impact via regulated prices. 
The planned government measures will have a significant impact on the inflation path mainly 
through two channels from the middle of the current year. The direct effect appears through the 
increase in VAT and excise taxes. In this respect, our calculations are similar to the ones in 
February, although the VAT increase in July will be much higher than previously assumed. The 
VAT rate of around 85% of the consumer basket will increase from 20% to 25%, while the VAT 
rate of approximately 8% of the basket will decline from 20% to 18%. The resulting technical 
effect is a 3.4% increase in the price level, 90% of which is estimated to appear in the price index 
in Q3.12 The magnitude of the tax increase is well illustrated by the fact that compared with 
previous years’ VAT increases, this one will result in a more than double increase in the price 
level compared to 2004 or 2006, and as a result of this increase, the average VAT rate will also be 
close to the highest rate of the regime before 2004. 
 
Chart 3-7 Average VAT rate of the consumption basket 2003–2009 
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In addition to the VAT increase, the two-step excise tax increase will add another 0.7% in total to 
the price level. Thus, the total technical effect of tax increases will be 4.1%, of which 3.7% will 
                                                 
12 The experiences of earlier VAT increases show that the entire technical effect did not appear in consumer prices, 
but only 80–90% of it, depending on the items involved. A smaller shift than the technical effect is justified by the 
recession in the economic environment, while the fact that this increase affects a larger segment of items, thus there 
is no room for substitution points in the opposite direction. 
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show up in the indices between 2009 July and December and an additional 0.4% in January 2010. 
The actual, direct inflationary impact, taking into consideration incomplete VAT pass-through, 
will be 3.7%, as shown in Table 3-2. In this case, it is also true that most of the increase will 
appear in the consumer price index between 2009 Q3 and 2010 Q3. 
Above and beyond the larger effects, in respect of regulated prices, we take into account both 
measures already in effect and also planned ones. The reduction in medication price subsidies and 
the restructuring of gas price compensation (if prices decline, for those who receive the subsidy, 
the amount of the latter will be reduced, not the fee to be paid by the consumers) are already in 
effect. Apart from the measures already in effect, we take into consideration the following 
announced measures: a further reduction of the gas price and district heating subsidies in 2010 as 
well as reduction of subsidies on long-distance travel and students’ meal subsidies. These effects 
combined will increase the price level by 0.8-0.9%, most of which will appear in the price index in 
2010. 
Table 3–2: Direct effect of government measures on inflation 
2009 2010 Total timing of measures
VAT 1,45 1,55 3,00 2009 July
excise tax 0,10 0,60 0,70 July 2009 and January 2010
regulated prices 0,29 0,53 0,82 various steps
Total 1,84 2,68 4,52  
While the government crisis management package increases inflation directly to a significant 
extent, other measures of the package will partly offset this effect. The restrictions affecting 
households (reduction of financial transfers, decline in real income stemming from the higher 
inflation) will reduce consumption demand, and thus they will play a determining role in the 
further deepening of the output gap. In addition, within the framework of tax restructuring, the 
contributions due on labour will decline considerably (by more than 5 percentage points), which 
can restrain the rate of price increases through lower unit labour costs in the labour market. 
However, when evaluating the inflation impulse arriving from the direction of unit labour costs, 
it should be noted that the effect of the aforementioned extremely low wage dynamics, the strong 
labour market adjustment and the tax restructuring is mitigated by the fact that owing to the 
economic crisis, the extent of the drop-of in production in the competitive sector – in 
manufacturing in particular – still results in a significant temporary increase in unit labour costs 
this year. In light of these combined effects, it is not surprising that in the current 
macroeconomic environment one of the most difficult components to capture in terms of 
inflation forecasting is the inflation-reducing effect of the decline in demand. Relying on our 
models and also taking account of the demand-reducing effect of the government package, we 
believe that consumption demand will have a significant inflation-reducing effect over the entire 
forecast period. 
As a result of all these effects, inflation close to price stability is expected for Q2. Then, starting 
from the middle of the year, tax increases may result in an increase in the annual price index 
towards 7%. From mid-2010, however, as the tax increases will not be included in the price index 
any more, the price index may fluctuate around 2% until end-2011 following a steep fall. 
Accordingly, an annual average of 4.5% is expected for this year. In 2010, despite the significant 
decline during the year, annual average inflation may be above the target again (4.3%), while in 
2011 it may be below the target (1.9%). It is also worth mentioning that core inflation values are 
expected to be lower than those of the consumer price index over the entire forecast period. 
From 2010 H2 on core inflation may fluctuate between 1-2%. 
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Chart 3-8 Consumer price index forecast 
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Inflation Inflation excluding VAT and excise tax rate changes  
* In the case of the CPI net of VAT, we have taken into consideration the impact of the feed-through of the 
VAT rate and excise duty increases to the CIP rather than their full technical impact. 
 
Table 3–3 Details of our inflation forecast 
Weight 08 Q1 08 Q2 08 Q3 08 Q4 09 Q1 09 Q2 09 Q3 09 Q4 10 Q1 10 Q2 10 Q3 10 Q4 11 Q1 11 Q2 11 Q3 11 Q4
Unprocessed food 5.9 13.8 11.3 2.1 -4.1 3.1 5.8 12.4 13.6 8.3 6.3 1.7 0.9 1.8 3.2 3.9 3.9
Vehicle fuel and market energy 7.0 14.8 13.3 12.8 -1.3 -11.5 -10.7 -5.6 5.0 16.4 13.1 7.8 7.5 3.5 2.9 2.4 2.0
Regulated prices 15.9 9.0 7.1 8.7 10.1 8.1 7.9 8.9 6.6 6.3 6.0 3.0 3.6 3.7 4.2 4.0 3.8
Core inflation 71.1 5.2 5.7 5.5 4.2 3.3 3.1 5.7 5.6 5.7 5.1 1.7 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.4
Consumer price index 100.0 6.9 6.8 6.3 4.3 3.0 3.1 5.8 6.2 6.7 5.9 2.4 2.1 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.0
Yearly avereage
Core inflation 5.2 4.4 3.5 1.3
Consumer price index 6.1 4.5 4.3 1.9  
Inflation and growth risks 
 
The main uncertainties surrounding our forecast are related to credit activity and the potential 
output of the economy13. 
In connection with our baseline scenario, we already indicated that lending may fall even lower 
than our earlier expectations in both the corporate and household sectors. Experiences in recent 
decades have shown that lending dynamics can remain negative for 3–4 years following a 
financial crisis, even if economic growth is able to pick up in the meantime. For lack of 
precedents in Hungary, the risk that lending will not pick up even until 2011 cannot be ignored, 
on the basis on international examples. In such a case, GDP dynamics over our entire forecast 
horizon may be lower than the baseline scenario, and the more negative output gap would reduce 
inflation as well. 
As mentioned previously, banks’ credit supply contracted sharply as a result of the financial crisis, 
triggering a larger decline in corporate investment than would have been expected given the 
slowdown in economic activity. The tightening in credit supply has made it difficult for a large 
number of firms to maintain access to working capital financing and previous levels of 
                                                 
13 Besides these factors, the external growth path and commodity prices are also important sources of uncertanities. 
However, as in these cases we see rather symmetric risks, these are not included as sperate scenarios for producing 
the fan chart. Through previous forecats errors, though, due to the prodcution technology of the fan chart, the 
widths of the fan chart is affected by these factors as well.   
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production. For this reason, the productive capacity of the Hungarian economy, i.e. potential 
output, may fall more sharply than embodied in the projection. If this is the case, then the 
economic downturn will not be associated with the assumed degree of oversupply in the product 
market. Consequently, the disinflationary effect may be lower and the outlook for longer-term 
growth may be worse than in the projection. Overall, and in view of the above uncertainties, the 
risks are to the upside for inflation and to the downside for growth relative to the projection over 
the entire forecast horizon. 
Chart 3-9 Fan chart of the inflation projection 
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Chart 3-10 Fan chart of the GDP projection 
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Table 3-4 Changes in our forecast compared to February 2009 
2008
February Current February Current February Current
Core inflation1 5.2 4.2 4.4 2.5 3.5 - 1.3
Consumer price index 6.1 3.7 4.5 2.8 4.3 - 1.9
External demand (GDP-based) 2.1 -1.2 -3.2 0.8 0.1 - 2.0
Household consumer expenditure -0.7 -5.1 -8.0 -1.6 -2.9 - 2.9
Fixed capital formation -2.6 -7.1 -10.3 -0.5 0.8 - 4.2
Domestic absorption -0.1 -4.5 -7.9 -1.2 -1.7 - 2.9
Export 4.6 -6.0 -15.1 4.8 3.0 - 8.7
Import 4.0 -7.1 -16.7 4.2 2.1 - 8.3
GDP* 0.5 -3.5 -6.7 -0.5 -0.9 - 3.4
As a percentage of GDP 8.4 3.9 4,1 4.5 4,0 - 3,3
EUR billions 8.9 3.6 3,6 4.2 3,5 - 3,1
As a percentage of GDP 7.4 2.1 2.0 1.7 1.4 - 0.2
Whole-economy gross average earnings 3 7.6 0.8 -0.3 6.5 2.1 - 4.5
Whole-economy employment4 -1.2 -2.0 -3.2 -1.8 -1.7 - 0.7
Private sector gross average earnings5 8.5 (8.0) 4.0 3.0 6.5 3.0 - 4.5
Private sector employment4 -1.1 -2.4 -4.0 -2.3 -2.1 - 0.9
Private sector unit labour cost4,6 6.2 6.4 5.7 2.0 -2.0 - 1.6
Household real income** -1.4 -1.8 -4.3 -1.2 -1.6 - 1.8
** MNB estimate.
Labour market
1 From May 2009 on, calculated according to the joint methodology of the CSO and MNB.
2 For the 2004-2007 period due to the high level of Net Errors and Omissions (NEO) the current account deficit/external financing requirement may be higher than suggested
by official figures. 
3 Calculated on a cash-flow basis.
4 According to the CSO LFS data.
5 According to the original CSO data. The numbers in brackets refer to wages excluding the effect of whitening and the changed seasonality of bonuses. 
6 Private sector unit labour costs calculated with a wage indicator excluding the effect of whitening and the changed seasonality of bonuses.
* The table contains orirignal data, including calendar effects.
Inflation (annual average)
Economic growth
Current account deficit2
External financing requirement2
2009 2010 2011
Actual
Projection
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Table 3–5 Our forecasts compared to other institutions’ projections 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Consumer Price Index (annual average growth rate, %)
MNB (May 2009) 8.0 6.1 4.5 4.3 1.9
Consensus Economics (April 2009)1 - - 2.0 - 3.4 - 4.5 1.6 - 3.2 - 4.7 -
OECD (November 2008) 8.0 6.4 3.6 3.2 -
European Commission (May 2009) 7.9 6.0 4.4 4.1 -
IMF (April 2009)* 7.9 6.1 3.8 2.8 -
Reuters-survey (April 2009)1 - - 2.2 - 3.7 - 4.9 2.5 - 3.6 - 5.8 1.9 - 2.9 - 4.0
GDP (annual growth rate, %)
MNB (May 2009) 1.1 0.5 -6.7 -0.9 3.4
Consensus Economics (April 2009)1 - - (-7.5) - (-5.2) - (3.5)(-2.0) - (-0.4) - 0.5 -
OECD (November 2008) 1.1 1.4 -0.5 1.0 -
European Commission (Május 2009) 1.1 0.5 -6.3 -0.3 -
IMF (April 2009)* 1.1 0.6 -3.3 -0.4 2.5
Reuters-survey (April 2009)1 - - (-7.5) - (-5.2) - (-4.0) 0.0 - 1.5 - 3.3 -
Current account deficit (percent of GDP)
MNB (May 2009) 6.5 8.4 4.1 4.0 3,3
OECD (November 2008) 6.5 6.1 6.1 5.4 -
European Commission (May 2009) 6.5 8.4 5.0 4.8 -
IMF (April 2009)* 6.5 7.8 3.9 3.4 -
Budget Deficit (ESA-95 method, percent of GDP)
MNB (May 2009) 5.0 3.4 3,9 4,5 4,3
Consensus Economics (April 2009)1 - - 2.0 - 3.0 - 3.4 2.0 - 2.7 - 3.4 -
OECD (November 2008) 5.0 3.4 3.6 3.5 -
European Commission (May 2009) 4.9 3.4 3.4 3.9 -
IMF (November 2009)* 4.9 3.4 2.5 2.0 -
Reuters-survey (April 2009)1 - - 2.7 - 3.1 - 5.0 2.5 - 2.8 - 3.3 -
Forecasts on the size of Hungary's export markets (annual growth rate, %)
MNB (May 2009) 8.5 4.2 -11.3 -0.3 4.4
OECD (March 2009)2,4 1.0 -10.3 0.1 -
European Commission (May 2009)2 7.5 3.4 -11.1 -0.8 -
IMF (April 2009)2 2.3 -13.2 -1.0 -
Forecasts on the GDP growth rate of Hungary's trade partners (annual growth rate, %)
MNB (May 2009) 3.8 2.1 -3.2 0.1 2.0
OECD (March 2009)2,4 0.8 -4.5 0.0 -
European Commission (May 2009)2 3.7 2.1 -4.1 0.2 -
IMF (April 2009)2 2.1 -4.1 -0.2 2.2
Forecasts on the GDP growth rate of euro area (annual growth rate, %)
MNB (May 2009) 2.7 0.7 -4.1 -0.3 1.5
OECD (March 2009) 2.6 0.7 -4.1 -0.3 -
European Commission (May 2009) 2.7 0.8 -4 -0.1 -
IMF (April 2009) 2.7 0.9 -4.2 -0.4 -
Sources: Eastern Europe Consensus Forecasts (Consensus Economics Inc. (London), January 2009); European Commission Economic Forecasts, May 2009; IMF 
World Economic Outlook (April 2009); Reuters survey (January 2009); OECD Economic Outlook (March 2009).
The projections of the MNB are ‘conditional’, which means that they cannot always be directly compared with the projections of other institutions.
1 For Reuters and Consensus Economics surveys, in addition to the average value of the analysed replies (i.e. the medium value), we also indicate the lowest and the 
highest values to illustrate the distribution of the data.
2 Values calculated by the MNB; the projections of the named institutions for the relevant countries are adjusted with the weighting system of the MNB, which is also 
used for the calculation of the bank’s own external demand indices. Therefore, these figures may deviate from the figures published by the specified institutions.
4 Since OECD did not publish any data on Romania, our OECD forecast excludes Romania.
* The figures refer to the IMF Staff Report for Hungary, published in April 2009.
3  The 2007 data takes account of the negative effect on the current account resulting from the Gripen purchase.
5  Original data, including calendar-day variations .
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4. General government and external balance 
4.1 Developments in the general government balance 
 
In 2008, the general government deficit according to the EDP methodology was 3.4% of GDP, 
in accordance with our February estimates. Taking account of the effect of the reform of the 
publicly managed pension pillar, Hungary complies with the Maastricht deficit criterion, but the 
deficit may be higher in the following years according to our forecast. Compared to earlier 
expectations, our forecast was altered by two important factors: the less favourable economic 
path on the one hand, and the recently announced – although yet only partly adopted – package 
of government measures on the other hand. The economic downturn will result in a decline in 
revenues in 2009 and 2010. This effect will be partly offset by cuts in expenditures, but partly 
contributes to a higher deficit. 
Table 4-1 Indicators of the general government balance and government debt as a percent of 
GDP 
2008 2009 2010 2011
Fact
GFS balance -3,6 -4,4 -4,9 -4,3
ESA balance -3,4 -3,9 -4,5 -4,3
ESA primary balance 0,8 0,8 0,5 0,6
Augmented SNA balance -3,9 -5,3 -6,1 -4,7
Cyclical component 0,6 -1,6 -2,7 -2,0
General government debt 73,0 81,8-83,6 83,1-83,9 80,7
Forecast
 
 
As a result of gradually deteriorating economic prospects, the fiscal adjustment necessary in 2009 
is larger than assumed in our February forecast. The deeper recession in itself increased the 
deficit by more than 1% of GDP, and a moderate increase in the interest payment also 
deteriorates the balance. Compared to February, the government measures announced so far 
offset approximately one half of the fiscal effect of the deeper recession. Therefore, we expect a 
3,9% ESA deficit in 2009, compared to 2.9% deficit projected in February. Our forecast includes 
reserves amounting to 0.3% of GDP. 
In 2010, the effects of the continued recession and other rising non-cyclical expenditure factors14 
could increase the deficit further. The government decided on additional spending cuts compared 
to February, but only to a lesser extent than the budgetary effect of the recession. The Hungarian 
government has committed to achieving a lower deficit in 2010 than in 2009. Nevertheless, our 
baseline forecast shows 4,5% deficit for 2010. The reason for this is that a certain part of the 
announced measures is not completely specified, consequently in line with our forecasting 
principles we could not take it into account. Most if it affects the central subsidy of local 
governments. Accepting these announced but not yet specified measures the deficit could 
decrease by 0.7% of GDP, hereby the deficit reduction compared to 2009 is achievable.  
The uncertainty resulting from the unspecified measures concern 2011 as well. In our baseline 
scenario with no policy change we expect a decline in the deficit-to-GDP ratio, caused by the 
                                                 
14 The effects of those non-cyclical expenditure factors which increase the deficit are usually small, but their 
combined effect is sizeable. These factors include increases in the deficit of the local governments, interest payments, 
and some expenditure, like contribution to the EU budget and compensation for the higher inflation in pensions. 
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automatic stabiliser effect becoming positive as a result of a pick-up in economic growth. Further 
measures are necessary in order to decrease the projected 4,3% deficit. It is important to note 
that some of the measures announced in 2009 are structural (cancelling 13th month pensions, 
change in the indexation of pensions, increase in the retirement age, reforming family support, 
decrease in price subsidies): in other words they may help contribute to a sustainable fiscal policy 
and enhance the rate of potential growth. 
The deficit-reducing effect of the changes will be felt completely through cuts in expenditures. 
The net effect of the changes in taxes is negligible on the revenue side, but the rearrangement 
from labour taxes to consumption taxes is significant. The adjustment measures and the ones 
resulting in tax restructuring have different impacts on the household and corporate sectors. The 
reduction of transfers to households and the increase in certain types of taxes, mainly 
consumption taxes, entail substantial deductions from households’ disposable income. By 
contrast, the changes in taxes add more to firms’ pre-tax income than the extent to which it is 
reduced by the restrictions on government consumption and investment demand. 
The current deficit projection is less favourable than the one issued in February, but as a 
consequence of the global economic recession, the expected fiscal deficit is increasing 
significantly in almost all European countries. Therefore, Hungary’s relative position in terms the 
size of fiscal deficit is improving among EU Member States in 2009. It should be noted that in 
addition to the negative effect of the automatic stabilizers, the countries which were in more 
favourable fiscal situations earlier are increasing the deficit with discretionary fiscal policy which 
may stimulate the economy. By contrast, in Hungary not only the fiscal expansion unfeasible, but 
even the negative budgetary effects of automatic stabilizers must be partly outweighed due to the 
much narrower fiscal room for manoeuvre. Accordingly, as opposed to international practice, 
Hungary is not pursuing an anti-cyclical economic policy, but a pro-cyclical one. Expenditure cuts 
and tax changes reduce GDP over the short run, but over the long term they add to the potential 
growth rate (see Box 3-2.). 
Considering the magnitude of the recession, it is worth paying special attention to the effect of 
automatic stabilisers and to the cyclically adjusted indicators. If the cyclical component, which 
shows the effect of the economic downturn, is deducted from the primary ESA balance, a strong, 
2% adjustment in 2009 becomes visible, followed by another 0.8% adjustment in 2010. The 
turning point is 2010, because then the growth rate of the economy is expected to exceed 
potential. Accordingly, provided that fiscal policy remains unchanged, in 2011 the cyclically 
adjusted balance will slightly deteriorate, mainly because of the government transfer to the MNB 
covering its losses in 2010.15 
                                                 
15 As the loss of the MNB is mainly accounted for by interest loss, the item would also be regarded as an interest 
expense; however, the expense is recorded in the primary balance, in accordance with statistical methodology. 
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Chart 4-1 The cyclical component and the cyclically adjusted primary ESA deficit (as a proportion 
of GDP) 
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Eroding revenues 
The first wave of fiscal adjustment in 2006–2007 relied heavily on revenue-side measures, which 
resulted in an increase in the main tax revenues as a proportion of GDP. It results from increased 
tax rates and the efforts aiming at “whitening” of the economy. However, in 2009 we expect a 
decline in tax revenues, partly because of the deep recession (corporate taxes), partly because of 
the decreasing tax efficiency. In 2010 the main tax bases change less favourable than GDP, which 
causes a further deterioration of revenues. Overall, government measures concerning taxes do 
not modify the total revenues, but nevertheless the effect on the revenues structure will be 
substantial. 
As a result of the stronger economic downturn, all important tax bases will decline even more 
than previously assumed. Following a decline in 2009, the nominal wage bill, which determines 
the personal income tax and the contributions, is not expected to reach its 2008 level even in 
2010. The picture is similar in the case of the household consumption, reducing the value added 
tax and the excise tax. As a result of the recession, GDP-proportionate tax revenues in 2011 will 
still be 2 percentage points lower than in 2008. 
The tax measures will have little fiscal effect, but will cause significant restructuring among the 
various types of taxes. The weight of taxes on labour will decline, and that of consumption and 
wealth-type taxes will increase, i.e. corporations’ burdens will decline in parallel with growing 
taxes paid by households. This year, the rate of contributions paid by employers will decline by 5 
percentage points up to the double of the minimum wage, while in 2010 the lower rate will be 
valid for total earnings. From the historical peak, this will reduce the GDP-proportionate 
contribution payments to the levels preceding the rate increase in 2006. Regarding taxes on 
capital, the termination of the corporate surtax, the increase in the regular rate, the reduction of 
exemptions and other minor measures together result in a slight reduction of tax burdens. 
In respect of taxes on households, larger-scale measures were adopted. Overall, they result in an 
increase in tax payment. The increase in the band limit of the personal income tax, the changes in 
tax rates and refunds represent a smaller tax cut in 2009 and a major one (over HUF 200 billion) 
in 2010. However this will be more than offset by significant increases in several types of taxes. 
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Raising the regular VAT rate to 25% has a latger effect by itself,16 but imposing taxes on fringe 
benefits are also significant. The government narrowed the group of assets subject to property 
tax and the revenue expected from property tax as well compared to the earlier plans. Among the 
measures offsetting this narrowing, we took into account only those that are underpinned by 
concrete strategies. 
Chart 4-2 Revenues from taxes and contributions as a proportion of GDP (excluding local 
governments) 
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Strong adjustment in primary expenditures 
As a result of the deepening recession, further steps became necessary, in addition to the 
expenditure cutting measures announced in February. The programme made public in April 
includes cutting HUF 336 billion in expenditures in 2009 compared to the December 2008 
Convergence Programme instead of the previously announced HUF 200 billion, and the effect of 
the package in 2010 increased by over HUF 800 billion. The reduction of the expenditures affects 
transfers to households as well as government consumption and investment. Tightening will 
occur primarily through financial and in-kind transfers to households, relating to pension 
expenditures first and foremost. 
Pension expenditures have been among the fastest-growing expenditure items in recent years, 
and the financing of the pension expenditure caused a major difficulty due to its weight. 
Therefore, a substantial part of the approved measures aims at improving the short- and longer-
term sustainability of pension expenditures. However, these expenditures will increase as a 
percentage of GDP both in 2009 and 2010, but may decline in 2011. The measures are efficient, 
which can be seen when we compare the expected expenditures with our previous projection. 
Compared to our February projection, expenditures in 2010 will be HUF 130 billion lower, and 
the saving will be slightly higher in the following years. Over the short run, the change with the 
greatest effect is the termination of the 13th month pension, which was much more limited in 
earlier plans, and the cancellation of the planned pension correction. The effect of increasing the 
age limit, the changing of the pension indexation and the stricter calculation of early pension may 
be felt over a longer term. Pension-related measures amount to more than one half of the change 
in the transfers to households. The plans also include the reduction of the family allowance, the 
home-building subsidies and some labour market expenditures. 
                                                 
16 Raising the VAT rate increases the tax burden of the companies as well but to a smaller extent. 
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In-kind transfers may be reduced via the dismantling the gas and district heating subsidies, a 
lower amount of school catering and cutting certain health expenditures. Of the above, the 
termination of heating subsidies weighs most. The elements of government consumption are a 
reduction in subsidies for MÁV, blocking of funds at ministries and freezing wages in the public 
sector in 2010. 
Increasing interest expenditures 
The declining–stagnating trend of net interest expenditures turned round in 2008, and the interest 
burden on government debt increased significantly, mainly as a result of rising yields. In 2009, as 
a result of the surge in government debt and the fall in GDP, interest payment as a proportion of 
GDP will continue to increase. A slight increase is expected in 2010 as well, but then the trend is 
expected to turn round. The main underlying reason is that the increase in debt will stop, and the 
effect of the increase in the ratio of lower-interest foreign currency debt in 2008 and 2009 will be 
felt more strongly. 
Our forecast for 2009 is based on the financing plan of the Government Debt Management 
Agency. It is uncertain whether Hungary will use the whole credit line which can be drawn from 
international organisations this year, but this does not change net interest expenditures 
significantly. As was also indicated in our February forecast, financing through international loans 
reduces interest expenditures compared to the situation when the government would have issued 
forint government securities with the same value but higher interest. On the other hand, 
indebtedness in foreign currency entails a significant exchange rate risk, which can involve not 
only the interest payments but also the redemptions. For the coming two years, we assumed that 
the government will gradually use the loans drawn in excess of the financing requirement and 
held in foreign currency deposits. In addition, we calculate an increasing bond issue, which would 
cover the expiring amount of bonds in 2010, and in 2011 the fiscal deficit as well.17 
Regarding the consolidated general government, the MNB’s interest income also has to be taken 
into account. Financing the general government from foreign currency substantially increases the 
two-week MNB bond holdings, and the interest paid on the higher holdings impairs the Central 
Bank’s profit. The effect of the realised exchange rate gain and the income received from the 
existing swap holdings vis-à-vis the ÁKK is just the opposite. Overall, we expect a Central Bank’s 
profit/loss close to 0 in 2009, and a deficit corresponding to 0.5% of GDP next year. 
Upside risk to the deficit-forecast 
A fan chart illustrating the risks has also been prepared, in addition to the projection fan chart. 
According to this, the risks around the central projection for the deficit lie to the upside over the 
entire forecast period. The effects of the macroeconomic path, one of the two main factors 
determining the distribution of uncertainty about the deficit, are nearly symmetrically dispersed 
over the entire forecast horizon. Within this, the significant downward asymmetry of GDP is 
counterbalanced by the upside risks to inflation, as the impact of the latter on the revenue side is 
stronger than that of GDP. 
                                                 
17 In terms of interest expenditures, it would be a risk if the Government Debt Management Agency (ÁKK) changed 
its foreign currency deposits to forints not through conversion, but through swap transactions with the MNB. In the 
case of swap transactions, the MNB pays foreign currency interest to the ÁKK, while the latter pays forint interest to 
the MNB: The net interest expenditures paid by ÁKK on these swaps stems from the relatively high interest rate 
differential. According to our calculations the ÁKK’s current swap holdings vis-à-vis the MNB increase the net 
interest expenditure of the government by 0.2-0.3% of GDP in 2009 and by 0.3% in 2010. There is a significant 
uncertainty about the future amount of swaps holding. It is important to note, that at the level of the consolidated 
general government the effect is 0, because the same amount improves the MNB’s result. However, in terms of the 
fiscal balance the effect is asymmetrical because, as opposed to interest expenditures, the MNB’s possible positive 
result is not shown in the ESA statistics, as it does not have to be paid. 
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Consequently, this asymmetry results from the perception of risk to items on the expenditure 
side. Three factors are responsible for the bulk of the risks of higher deficit. One is the co-
financing of investment projects implemented on EU funds, where there is a risk of higher 
spending than envisaged. Secondly, a potential ease of the wage freeze in the public sector may 
increase the expenditures of budgetary institutions. Thirdly, based on experiences we regard 
conceivable, that the indebted public transport companies with financing difficulties would 
needed government subsidies in the coming years. An additional risk factor in 2011 is that the 
EU funds to finance the construction of the Budapest underground may fall short of the required 
level and the difference is borne either by the Government or the Municipality of Budapest. 
Chart 4-3 The fiscal fan-chart 
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Declining government debt in the long-term 
As a result of borrowings from international organizations, by the end of 2008 the debt-to-GDP 
ratio had surged to 73%. In 2009, the debt ratio may continue to increase close to 84%, mainly as 
a result of the deteriorating macroeconomic environment and in spite of the surplus of the 
primary balance. However, it is highly probable that downward trend will start after 2010, and the 
debt ratio may decline again to around 80% in 2011. 
One factor of uncertainty in our forecast is the financing strategy of the ÁKK. Therefore, we 
quantify two scenarios in our calculations. In the one scenario, we postulated the ÁKK drawing 
the total international credit line and holding its part not used for financing in the form of foreign 
currency deposit with the MNB (Scenario I). In the other scenario, we assumed the ÁKK using 
the international credit line only to the extent corresponding to the financing requirement of the 
government (Scenario II). Overall, depending on the financing strategy, the debt ratio is expected 
to peak in 2009–2010, and is then highly likely to embark on a downward trend in 2011. In 
Scenario I, the debt ratio will peak around 83.5% in 2009, before stagnating in 2010, while in 
Scenario II ratios of 82% and 83% are expected for 2009 and 2010, respectively. As a result of a 
gradual decline in foreign currency deposits, in 2011 the values of the two types of debt ratios 
converge at around 80.5%. 
Box 4-1.:  Are Hungarian debt dynamics sustainable? 
In addition to our debt projection covering the time horizon of the inflation forecast, we also 
prepared a simulation of the expected longer-term developments in the government debt-to-
GDP ratio after 2012 and until 2020. Regarding the real economic and fiscal variables which 
determine debt dynamics, the following assumptions were used in our simulation: 
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1. Output gap closes gradually: we expect a negative gap until 2018. Following a somewhat 
larger decline in 2009–2010 compared to the path without the measures, the fiscal 
adjustment package results in faster GDP growth. 
2. From 2012 on, we assumed 3% for domestic inflation and 2% for foreign inflation. 
3. We assumed a stable EUR/HUF exchange rate in nominal terms (fixed at its current 
level), i.e. due to the inflation differential this represents mild real appreciation. 
4. We examine two possible paths regarding the implicit real interest rate18 on government 
debt. Firstly we assume that the implicit interest rate will return to its historic level of 
around 2% from 2012 on. Additionally, we examined an alternative path, in which we 
assumed a higher (4.5%) real interest rate over the longer term. 
5. The cyclically adjusted primary balance of the general government will remain at an 
unchanged level from 2012 on, i.e. we assume that following the series of measures in 
2009 there will be no changes in fiscal policy. Accordingly, the assumed closure of the 
output gap will result in a significant improvement in the fiscal balance.19 
6. In our simulation, we attempted to take into account the quasi-fiscal activity of the 
government as well as the gradual transformation of the implicit debt in the pension 
system into explicit debt. Within this framework we attempted, for example, to quantify 
the expected losses of public transport companies (MÁV, BKV), the expected profit of 
MVM and the higher pension payments resulting from demographic developments. 
These effects were taken into account starting from 2012. Overall, as a result of the above 
effects, by the end of the period the debt ratio will increase only slightly, by 
approximately 2% of GDP. 
7. In 2011–2012, repayment of government loans extended to commercial banks (OTP, 
MFB, FHB, Eximbank) in 2009 will also mean additional financing source for the 
government. It contributes to the debt decrease. 
8. Neither the measures announced last April, nor the ones announced in February were 
taken into account in the scenario excluding the measures.  
Based on our simulation, mainly due to the favourable starting level of the primary balance 
and economic growth characterised by gradually increasing strength, the adjustment package 
announced in April will result in a much lower debt ratio by the end of the period under 
review than what would have evolved without the measures. As a result of the announced 
measures and the improving macroeconomic environment, a 55% debt ratio is likely to 
evolve by the end of the period.20 In our simulation, we examined how the debt path change, 
if we assume a higher (4.5%) real interest rate. In this case, the debt ratio decreases less 
strongly, declining to just around 65% at the end of the period. 
                                                 
18 Implicit real interest rate means the percentage value of real interest expenditures on the debt projected to the 
debt. 
19 In our simulation, we assumed that after 2012 the fiscal balance will improve similarly to the extent as the output 
gap approaches its potential level, i.e. the extent of the change in the deficit will be identical with that of the cyclical 
component. 
20 In the scenario without these measures (both current and potential), economic growth is lower and, in parallel with 
this, the size of the primary balance is also less favourable. In addition, of course it may also happen that without 
adjustment the yield level may also be higher. Therefore, in the scenario without measures, we assumed that real 
interest rates remain at a high level of 4.5% and do not return to the historical average. In that case the debt ratio will 
not decline in the scenario without measures, but will stagnate first, and over the medium term it may increase again, 
reaching about 85% by the end of the period under review. 
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Chart 4-4 Projected developments in government debt-to-GDP ratio under various scenarios 
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The approximately 30 percentage point improvement in the debt ratio between 2011 and 2020 is 
almost completely attributable to the effect of the primary balance, while the effect of real 
economic developments also contribute to the decline to a limited degree as well. Although real 
growth improves the debt ratio by more than 20 percentage points, the real interest rate 
component offsets it by 17 percentage points. In our simulation, the effect of the real exchange 
rate may be considered as insignificant, although it is important to note that this basically stems 
from our stable nominal exchange rate assumption.21 
There are two more important issues to emphasize. In our calculations, the starting point for the 
deficit in 2011 was around 4%. If there are further measures to lower the deficit and to achieve 
the 3% Maastricht criterion, then the resulting more favourable starting point could improve the 
debt path. By contrast, if the risk perception on Hungary does not improve over the longer term 
and yields remain at a higher level (4.5%), then the development of the debt ratio could be more 
unfavourable. 
 
4.2 External balance 
In 2008, the external financing requirement – the sum of the current and the capital account – 
amounted to 7.4% of GDP, representing a nearly 2 percentage point increase compared to the 
previous year.22 The deterioration in the balance, which is surprising considering the weak 
performance of the Hungarian economy, is attributable partly to the significant deterioration of 
the external environment and partly to the one-off effect relating to the timing of EU transfers. 
Among the external factors, the economic slowdown of Hungary’s main export markets and the 
increase in the costs of funding are worth emphasising. On the one hand, as a result of the 
recession which has affected Hungary’s external markets as well, the country’s export 
performance started to decelerate from the middle of the year, showing a drastic slump in the last 
quarter. At the same time, shrinking domestic demand had a strongly perceptible effect on 
                                                 
21 Currently, more than 40 per cent of the public debt is denominated in foreign currency (more than 30% of GDP), 
meaning that a 1-percentage point change in the exchange rate modifies the debt ratio by 0.3 per cent of the GDP. 
22 The CSO carried out significant revisions to the 2008 foreign trade figures in March. This revision almost 
completely explains the difference between the external financing requirement estimated for 2008 in the February 
inflation report (6.8%) and the actual data. 
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import demand as well, although until end-2008 the decline in exports dominated the 
developments in the trade balance. Consequently, the balance of goods and services as a 
proportion of GDP, which is key in terms of equilibrium, gradually declined in the course of 
2008. On the other hand, the fact that obtaining external funds became more difficult was also 
reflected in the developments in the income balance via the increase in the costs of funding. The 
increase in net income outflow in 2008 is mainly attributable to the growing interest burdens on 
debt-type liabilities. Balance of payments data indicate that, as a result of the financial crisis, 
domestic economic agents were only able to roll over their maturing debts at shorter maturities 
and higher interest rates. 
Chart 4-5 Components of the external financing requirement 
(seasonally adjusted data, as a proportion of GDP) 
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* Dividends are usually voted for in the first half of the year. In 2008, in an unusual manner, a large 
Hungarian company voted for a significant amount of dividend in July, which upset the typical seasonality of 
the income balance. In the time series shown, this item was corrected back to Q2. 
The fact that EU funds, which are recorded among current and capital transfers, declined 
considerably compared to the previous year exacerbated the deterioration in external balance 
indicators in 2008. However, it is important to stress that EU grants appear in the balance of 
payments at the moment of their respective transfer (cash basis), which may be significantly 
different from the time when the funds are actually used. One result of this accounting method is 
that the timing of a high-amount transfer may cause significant fluctuations in the financing 
requirement. In 2008, for example, despite an increase in the use of EU transfers, the value of 
transferred EU-funds declined, thus adding to the external financing requirement. However, this 
decline in inflows of funds proved to be temporary, as the value of EU transfers received in the 
first months of 2009 already significantly exceed the amount received last year as a whole. 
In analysing developments in external equilibrium in 2008, it is also important to take into 
account that a technical estimation is applied in the statistics for income on foreign direct 
investments, and the deficit may be overestimated when the economic environment is marked by 
recessionary conditions. Nearly three quarters of the deficit of the income balance is related to 
net income outflows relating to FDI, which is estimated on the basis of historical profitability in 
the first publication. As a result of deteriorating corporate profitability, this historical relationship 
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may overestimate the income from foreign investment and thus the external financing 
requirement as well.23 
The forced adjustment of the private sector’s consumption–investment behaviour already started 
at the end of last year. Consequently, an unusually strong improvement in external equilibrium is 
expected in 2009. The fall in net bank borrowing suggests a substantial increase in the financial 
savings of the household sector, in spite of the decline in the sector’s real income. The 
information available up to 2009 Q1 already confirm the sharp turn in the trend of households’ 
savings. At the same time, a pronounced decline is also expected in the financing requirement of 
the corporate sector, which may be justified by the postponement of investment, increasing EU 
transfers and the reduction of contributions to be paid to the state. The SNA deficit of the 
general government may significantly increase,24 despite the substantial expenditure cutting 
measures, but the country’s external financing requirement as a proportion of GDP may still 
decline by more than 5 percentage points compared to the previous year. 
Table 4–2 GDP-proportionate net financing capacity of individual sectors 
(in per cent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated) 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
I. Consolidated general government* -8,3 -8,4 -9,4 -9,6 -5,9 -3,9 -5,4 -5,8 -4,5
II. Households 0,2 2,4 4,4 3,3 1,7 1,2 5,1 5,4 4,7
Corporate sector and "error" (= A - I.- II. ) 0,1 -2,3 -1,7 -0,7 -1,2 -4,3 -1,7 -1,0 -0,4
A. External financing capacity, "from above"(=B+ -8,0 -8,3 -6,7 -6,9 -5,4 -7,4 -2,0 -1,4 -0,2
B. Current account balance -8,0 -8,6 -7,5 -7,5 -6,5 -8,4 -4,1 -4,0 -3,3
   - in EUR billions -5,9 -7,1 -6,7 -6,8 -6,6 -8,9 -3,6 -3,5 -3,1
C. Capital account balance 0,0 0,3 0,8 0,6 1,1 1,1 2,2 2,7 3,2
D. Net errors and omissions (NEO)** 0,3 -1,4 -1,8 -2,3 -1,6 -2,0 -2,4 -2,4 -2,2
External financing capacity "from below" (=A+D) -7,7 -9,7 -8,6 -9,3 -7,0 -9,4 -4,4 -3,7 -2,4
Estimation Forecast
 
* In addition to the fiscal budget, the consolidated general government includes local governments, ÁPV Ltd., institutions discharging 
quasi-fiscal duties (MÁV, BKV), the MNB and authorities implementing capital projects initiated and controlled by the government 
and formally implemented under PPP schemes. ** In our forecast for the ‘errors and omissions’ item of the balance of payments we 
assumed that the cumulated figure for the last four quarters would remain unchanged. 
The improvement in external balance accompanying the real economy adjustment may appear as 
a considerable increase in the surplus of the goods and services balance, mainly due to the decline 
in import demand. The latest monthly trade data already clearly reflect the improvement in the 
trade balance. No major change is expected in the income balance, although this may be a result 
of contradictory effects. As a result of the recession, income from direct investment in Hungary 
may decline considerably, while the repricing of expiring debt and the weaker exchange rate 
suggest a further increase in the interest burdens of external debt. Current and capital transfers 
from the EU may increase considerably in 2009, which may also contribute significantly to the 
decline in the external financing requirement. 
                                                 
23 The estimate for 2008 will be replaced by the reported data in September 2009. 
24 The expenditures of the M6 motorway, which is being built in a PPP scheme, play an important role in the 
increase in the SNA deficit. These expenditures will not appear in the official ESA figures in 2009. 
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Table 4–3 Structure of the GDP-proportionate current account 
(in per cent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated) 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1. Balance of goods and services -3,8 -2,9 -1,2 -0,9 1,4 0,9 4,5 4,6 4,9
2.  Income balance -4,9 -5,2 -5,7 -6,2 -7,4 -8,1 -8,1 -7,9 -7,8
3. Balance of current transfers 0,8 -0,5 -0,6 -0,5 -0,5 -1,2 -0,6 -0,6 -0,3
 I. Current account balance (1+2+3) -8,0 -8,6 -7,5 -7,5 -6,5 -8,4 -4,1 -4,0 -3,3
Current account balance in EUR billions -5,9 -7,1 -6,7 -6,8 -6,6 -8,9 -3,6 -3,5 -3,1
 II. Capital account balance 0,0 0,3 0,8 0,6 1,1 1,1 2,1 2,6 3,1
    External financing capacity (I+II) -8,0 -8,3 -6,7 -6,9 -5,4 -7,4 -2,0 -1,4 -0,2
Fact/Preliminary fact Forecast
 
Further gradual improvement of the external equilibrium is forecasted for 2010 and 2011. The 
reduction in taxes on labour strengthens the country’s export competitiveness, which may result 
in a continuation of the increase in the trade surplus even during a period of rising domestic 
absorption. The increase in the funds from the EU shown in the transfer items of the balance of 
payments also facilitates the reduction of the dependency on foreign funding. 
4.2.1 Financing the current account deficit 
Regarding 2008 as a whole, the developments in the financing structure of the balance of 
payments were rather unfavourable from an investor point of view. In 2008, the ‘bottom-up’ 
external financing requirement increased to EUR 9.9 billion, which corresponds to 9.4% of GDP. Net 
non-debt generating items amounted to less than one tenth of external fund raising. As a result of 
the high debt-generating financing and exchange rate depreciation in the last quarter, the 
country’s net external debt reached 54% of GDP at end-2008. 
The wave of the international financial crisis that reached Hungary in October 2008 left a visible 
mark on the financing side of the balance of payments as well. The inevitable adjustment to the 
scarcity of external funds was partly implemented on the assets side over the short run, i.e. 
through a reduction in the private sector’s external assets. In recent years, for example, 
substantial non-debt creating capital outflows were observed, in which the portfolio-type stock 
purchases by domestic institutional investors played a significant role. However, in the final 
quarter of 2008 capital outflows in this form declined considerably. Regarding debt instruments, 
a decline in assets, i.e. capital withdrawal was also typical of both the domestic banking sector 
and non-financial firms. However, it is important to emphasise that the banking sector – while 
its external assets were declining – was also able to obtain significant amounts of new funds 
from abroad. 
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Chart 4-6 The private sector's external debt-type liabilities and assets (cumulated flow data) 
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It is also worth noting that in Q4 the liquidity needs of the banking sector were boosted 
considerably by transactions related to financial derivatives with non-residents. Most of them are 
HUF/FX swaps; accordingly, during periods of significant fluctuations in the HUF exchange rate 
a co-movement of net derivative financing and exchange rate changes is usually experienced. In 
the last quarter of 2008, in the period of money market tensions, the HUF depreciated 
significantly against major currencies, which considerably reduced the balance of the financial 
account through the closed transactions and margin calls. 
Chart 4-7 Net financial derivatives flow and exchange rate changes 
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